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BEYOND LAW AND FACT: JURY EVALUATION
OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
Lauren M. Ouziel*
ABSTRACT
Criminal trials today are as much about the adequacy and legitimacy of the defendant’s
accusers—police and prosecutors—as the alleged deeds of the accused. Yet we lack theory to
conceptualize this reality, doctrine to set its parameters, and institutional mechanisms to adapt to
it. The traditional framework used by courts and scholars to delineate the jury’s role—along the
continuum between “fact-finding” and “law-finding”—is inadequate to the task. Jury evaluations of law enforcement are more accurately conceptualized as enforcement-finding, a process
that functions both in and outside that continuum. In considering enforcement-finding’s justification and proper scope, history offers a useful analytical frame. Over time, the criminal jury’s
role has evolved within the surrounding criminal enforcement environment. Jury evaluation of
law enforcement is an adaptation in that process; it arose, and persists, because the system needs
it. This insight should inform our approach. Rather than resisting enforcement-finding, or
mistaking it for something else, we should instead accept, accommodate, and even leverage it.
Institutional design should balance potential hazards against systemic benefits. And doctrine
should enable courts to openly and transparently balance the need for jury evaluation of law
enforcement against potentially competing adjudicative values.

INTRODUCTION
Courts and scholars frame the jury’s role along a continuum between
fact and law.1 At one end, the jury engages in “fact-finding,” ascertaining
historical fact pertinent to guilt.2 At the other, the jury is said to be “law© 2016 Lauren M. Ouziel. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Assistant Professor, Temple University Beasley School of Law. Thanks to Jane
Baron, Stephanos Bibas, Pam Bookman, Meg DeGuzman, George Fisher, Craig Green,
Dave Hoffman, Corinna Lain, Andy Monroe, Liz Porter, Dan Richman, Jessica Roth, Chris
Slobogin, David Sonenshein, participants at the Criminal Justice Roundtable at Yale Law
School and the CrimFest conference at Cardozo Law School, and the editors of the Notre
Dame Law Review.
1 See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional
Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 35–36 (2003); Nancy S.
Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 877 (1999).
2 See, e.g., DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS
(2012) (describing the pitfalls and challenges to a jury’s accurate assessments of historical
691
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finding”: assessing whether the defendant’s conduct, if legally prohibited,
merits criminal sanction in the circumstances at hand.3 And along the continuum, juries apply facts to law—determining whether the laws as set forth
by the court apply to the defendant’s conduct.4 This framework is a mainstay
of much of the jury literature, and a guiding principle of evidentiary doctrine. Yet it misses a central function of today’s criminal jury: evaluating law
enforcement.
Sometimes jury evaluation of law enforcement requires finding facts
directly pertinent to guilt, as when, for instance, an eyewitness’s recollection
or identification, or a defendant’s confession, may have been tainted by
police interference. But sometimes the link between guilt and law enforcement conduct is more tenuous. An eyewitness identifies a photograph of a
defendant as the perpetrator—why did the police initially select the defendant’s photograph to show the witness? Officers lawfully stop the defendant
on the street, frisk him, and recover a gun—what caused them to stop the
defendant in the first place? An accomplice testifies for the prosecution—to
which crimes does the prosecutor require the accomplice to plead guilty, and
which has she permitted to be overlooked?
These are the sorts of inquiries that pervade criminal trials. When permitted, they are framed as part of the jury’s fact-finding role, needed to establish the “background” of the investigation, “complete the story” of the crimes
on trial, or test law enforcement witnesses’ credibility.5 When precluded,
they are cast as entreaties to “nullification”—impermissible attempts at a verdict contrary to law.6 Scholars, too, frame jury evaluations of law enforcement in this way, distinguishing the fact-based from the nullificatory.7
fact); George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575 (1997) (describing the
evolution of the jury’s role in judging witness credibility).
3 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in
the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867 (1994); Matthew P. Harrington, The Law-Finding
Function of the American Jury, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 377; Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of
Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1939).
4 See supra note 1.
5 See infra notes 16–20 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
7 See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REV.
1149, 1172–78 (1997) (categorizing acquittals based on improper police conduct as “nullification,” but arguing such nullification is lawful under contemporary rule-of-law theories);
Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105
YALE L.J. 677 (1995) (theorizing acquittals based on jurors’ perception of racially-motivated prosecutions as “nullification”); Paula L. Hannaford-Agor & Valerie P. Hans, Nullification at Work? A Glimpse from the National Center for State Courts Study of Hung Juries, 78 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1249, 1272–75 (2003) (distinguishing police credibility from evidential
strength); Marder, supra note 1, at 877, 891, 900–01 (describing as “nullification” a jury’s
rejection of the state’s choice to prosecute a case of marginal seriousness, or of cases
involving police misconduct); see also Nancy S. Marder, The Interplay of Race and False Claims
of Jury Nullification, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 285, 304–05 (1999) (distinguishing verdicts
based on assessments of police credibility from those based on “nullification”).
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Yet jury evaluations of law enforcement do not always fall squarely in
either category. Evaluating law enforcement goes beyond traditional factfinding, both because it entails a normative judgment (did the police do or
not do x and should they have done or not done x?) and because the facts to
be found may not pertain exclusively to the question of guilt.8 At the same
time, such evaluations do not always implicate “law”—at least, not in the
traditional sense of constitutional, statutory, or common law. Those sources
set floors for police and prosecutorial conduct, not standards by which juries
evaluate it.9 Nor does an acquittal based in part on law enforcement malfeasance necessarily constitute “nullification,” because in practice, it is often
impossible to separate the strength of the evidence from the perceived competence and legitimacy of those who gather and present it.10 Evaluations of
law enforcement, in short, are neither entirely fact-finding, nor law-finding,
nor even a combination of the two. They are what we might call enforcementfinding.
Enforcement-finding occurs when juries assess evidence of guilt together
with the actions of those who gathered it;11 when they ascertain not only
what police and prosecutors have done, but whether those actions—legal or
not12—are appropriate and desirable. Enforcement-finding can transform a
jury’s focus from the alleged acts of the accused to those of the accusers. It is
a phenomenon that permeates criminal adjudication—affecting not just trials, but plea bargaining, discovery, and even charging decisions. And yet, it
remains under-examined.13 We lack theory to conceptualize this jury role,
8 See infra Section I.B.
9 See infra Section I.B.
10 See infra Section I.B; subsection III.A.4.
11 A rich body of literature explores legitimacy’s role in harnessing citizens’ compliance with laws and deference to legal authority. Salient examples include TOM R. TYLER,
WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006); Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391 (2000); Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation:
Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 234
(2008). The research raises under-examined questions as to legitimacy’s role in criminal
adjudication. See infra note 13.
12 I refer here to unconstitutional conduct that has not resulted in evidentiary exclusion. For example, an illegal arrest and subsequent search, made in good-faith reliance on
facts or circumstances later proven false or erroneous, will be admitted at trial and the jury
will typically hear the circumstances of the arrest and search notwithstanding its illegality.
See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Or, to take another common example,
evidence obtained unlawfully in respect to one person may nevertheless be admissible
against another. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978). I discuss how un-remedied
constitutional violations influence jury evaluation of law enforcement, infra notes 130–39
and accompanying text.
13 As I discuss in Section I.A, some empirical work has touched on the dynamic,
though only one study has addressed it head-on. See Amy Farrell et al., Juror Perceptions of
the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities and Decision Making in Criminal Cases, 38 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 773 (2013); infra notes 42–48 and accompanying text. My own prior work has
discussed the ways in which jurors’ assessment of law enforcement may partly explain outcome disparities in federal and state prosecutions of street crime. E.g., Lauren M. Ouziel,
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doctrine to set its parameters, and institutional mechanisms to accommodate
it.
This Article aims to fill those gaps, systematically re-conceptualizing the
criminal jury’s role and the criminal justice system’s response to it. First, the
Article explores enforcement-finding’s processes and effects, and demonstrates the inadequacy of the law/fact framework to set enforcement-finding’s proper scope. Second, it situates enforcement-finding in historical
context, examining how it developed and why it persists. Finally, and from
these accounts, the Article stakes its normative claim: enforcement-finding is
a pervasive, inevitable, and needed feature of contemporary American criminal justice. Rather than camouflaging it as “fact-finding,” or resisting it as
“law-finding,” we should engage and confront enforcement-finding in all its
messy complexity. Enforcement-finding poses difficult judicial choices. It
may require some institutional accommodations. But it also offers opportunities to enhance law enforcement accountability and adjudicative legitimacy.
Some clarifications are in order. My account does not encompass prosecutions of police, a small and atypical class of cases raising unique jury/law
enforcement dynamics. Nor am I focused on jury judgments of Fourth
Amendment reasonableness, a subject others have addressed.14 My target is
the bread-and-butter criminal trial—the robberies, thefts, drug deals, frauds,
and other cases that make up the bulk of state and federal felony dockets—
and the actions, constitutional or not, of police, agents, and prosecutors who
investigate and charge them. It is also important to stress that my claim is
Legitimacy and Federal Criminal Enforcement Power, 123 YALE L.J. 2236 (2014). In a recent
piece, Anne Poulin argues that evidentiary doctrine should reject “the investigation narrative”—the story of how and why the prosecution’s evidence came to be—while elsewhere,
Dan Richman has argued that such evidence enables jurors to assess more critically the
strength of the prosecution’s case. Anne Bowen Poulin, The Investigation Narrative: An
Argument for Limiting Prosecution Evidence, 101 IOWA L. REV. 683, 685 (2016); Daniel Richman, Framing the Prosecution, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 673 (2014).
This Article expands the discussion beyond the empirical and doctrinal, to probe the
criminal jury’s role from a theoretical, historical, and structural perspective. What, exactly,
does juror evaluation of law enforcement entail—is it fact-finding, law-finding, or something else? How, and why, did criminal trials become evaluations of law enforcement?
And how do the answers to these questions illuminate the normative: What should be the
criminal jury’s role, and the justice system’s response?
14 See, e.g., Ronald J. Bacigal, Putting the People Back into the Fourth Amendment, 62 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 359 (1994) (arguing that criminal juries should adjudicate Fourth Amendment challenges by applying Fourth Amendment law, as instructed by the court, to the
particular facts of the case); Meghan J. Ryan, Juries and the Criminal Constitution, 65 ALA. L.
REV. 849 (2014) (arguing that judges should make the initial determination of admissibility
of evidence under the Fourth Amendment, following which the jury should make the subsequent determination of whether to accept or reject that evidence under Fourth Amendment law); George C. Thomas III & Barry S. Pollack, Saving Rights from a Remedy: A Societal
View of the Fourth Amendment, 73 B.U. L. REV. 147, 150 (1993) (proposing jury panels to
adjudicate pretrial motions to suppress evidence); cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment
First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994) (proposing that civil juries adjudicate and
award damages for Fourth Amendment violations).
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party-neutral. Embracing jury evaluation of law enforcement does not, as a
general matter, favor the defense or the prosecution; its effect in a given case
depends on the jury’s perception of law enforcement’s actions in the case at
hand and, potentially, more broadly.15 Finally, I do not seek to supplant
existing theories of jury decisionmaking, or to discount the influence of
other prevalent trial dynamics. Enforcement-finding is not the only, and not
always the primary, focus of the criminal jury (though it can be in certain
cases or categories of cases). But it is an important focus, and one that has
received too little scholarly attention.
The Article proceeds as follows. Section I.A explores the extent, scope,
and influence of enforcement-finding, drawing on trials and court rulings,
observational studies, and empirical research. Section I.B exposes the poverty of the fact/law framework to set enforcement-finding’s boundaries.
Part II places enforcement-finding in historical context. It situates the
jury’s role, and enforcement-finding’s rise, within historic transformations in
criminal law and enforcement. In so doing, it reveals enforcement-finding as
a natural and necessary adaptation to these changes. Enforcement-finding
arose, and persists, for good reason.
These insights should guide our approach. Rather than disguise or
resist this phenomenon, we should acknowledge, accept, and accommodate
it. Part III describes how. Institutional design should aim to minimize
enforcement-finding’s risks while leveraging its regulatory potential. And
doctrine should enable transparency and balance—litigants and courts
should openly concede enforcement-finding’s probative value, balancing it
against potentially competing concerns around fairness, accuracy, and
efficiency.
I. WHAT IS ENFORCEMENT-FINDING?
Enforcement-finding has become so ingrained in criminal adjudication
we rarely pause to consider its processes or effects. As a result, we have not
given due thought to what, exactly, it is, and how we ought to approach it.
Courts and scholars too often mistake enforcement-finding for something
else, or, recognizing it, apply a framework that doesn’t quite fit.
This Part unravels enforcement-finding’s processes, explores the depth
of its influence, and exposes its insusceptibility to the fact/law framework.
Subsection A.1 explores how tightly the phenomenon is woven into the fabric
of criminal adjudication—from evidentiary doctrine to jury instructions to
discovery to plea bargaining to charging decisions. Subsection A.2 mines the
empirical data on jury evaluation of law enforcement, confirming the phenomenon is real, influential, and complex. Section B reveals the poverty of
the fact/law framework to set enforcement-finding’s proper boundaries.
15 See Ouziel, supra note 13 (discussing how positive citizen perceptions of federal law
enforcement can strengthen federal prosecutors’ hands as compared to their local
counterparts).
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Enforcement-Finding in Practice

Evidentiary Doctrine and the Courtroom Dynamic

How criminal cases are tried and bargained is, in large part, a reflection
of litigants’ and courts’ beliefs about jury decisionmaking. Both evidentiary
doctrine and adjudicative practice reflect an abiding and pervasive belief that
jurors implicitly evaluate law enforcement—and consternation about how to
handle it.
Start with the phenomenon’s most ubiquitous manifestation in evidentiary doctrine: as the “background of the investigation” (or the “why the
police did what they did”) justification for admitting otherwise inadmissible
evidence. After establishing the preliminaries, the prosecutor brings the
officer to the point in time at which he has initiated some critical action with
respect to the defendant: stopping him, or placing his photograph in an
array shown to an eyewitness, or perhaps even arresting him. The inevitable
next question ensues: Why did the police officer do this? The answers vary,
but typically involve some explanation of what brought the defendant to the
officer’s attention. In the most contested example, it is the defendant’s prior
crimes;16 or, somewhat less contested, his immediately preceding unlawful
yet uncharged conduct,17 or information the police officer received over the
radio or from an informer regarding the crime and the description of the
perpetrator.18
16 See, e.g., United States v. Rosse, 418 F.2d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 1969) (holding that the
defendant’s prior crimes were relevant to explain the reason for the investigation and the
method used by the postal inspectors to find who was guilty); United States v. Eagle Thunder, 873 F. Supp. 1362, 1375 (D.S.D. 1994) (finding evidence of the defendant’s prior
arrests admissible to show “why the officers stopped the vehicle and how they were able to
identify both the vehicle and its occupants”); Rodriguez v. United States, 915 A.2d 380,
384–87 (D.C. 2007) (holding that evidence suggesting police officers recognized appellant
from the victim’s description based on “prior contacts” and knowing him “from the area”
was admissible to explain why the officers included appellant’s photograph in a photo
array for purposes of identification).
17 See, e.g., Green v. United States, 440 A.2d 1005, 1007 (D.C. 1982) (holding that, in
prosecution for marijuana possession, police officers’ testimony that they saw defendant
make two different marijuana sales prior to his arrest “plac[ed] in a context and [made]
comprehensible to the jury the actions of the police in approaching, arresting, and searching appellant”); People v. Fay, 444 N.Y.S.2d 629, 631 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (finding that, in
prosecution for gun possession, a police officer’s testimony that he stopped the defendant
because he matched the description given over the radio of the perpetrator of a robbery
was admissible to explain reason for stop because “otherwise . . . the jury would speculate
in ‘filling in’ the picture to conform with their common sense perception of reality when
confronted by the defendant’s claim that the gun was ‘planted’”).
18 See, e.g., United States v. Trujillo, 136 F.3d 1388, 1396 (10th Cir. 1998) (ruling an
FBI agent’s testimony of a witness’s description of a bank robber was admissible as evidence of the focus of the investigation, not to prove the truth of the description); United
States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1021 (10th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (finding an officer’s
testimony that an informant told him the defendant had a gun and wanted to kill the
officer admissible to explain the officer’s aggressive conduct towards the defendant and
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None of this evidence pertains to, or is admissible for purposes of, establishing guilt. Whether the police officer investigated the right guy depends on
the other evidence in the case, whether it be the eyewitness’s description of
the perpetrator or identification of the defendant, or the physical or documentary evidence linking the defendant to the crime, or the testimony of the
defendant’s accomplice, or the defendant’s own statements. Yet prosecutors
routinely offer this type of evidence, and courts often admit it—a reflection
of their intuition that juror assessment of reasonable doubt is tied up in
assessments of law enforcement’s conduct. And not merely conduct that
implicates the reliability of the investigation (and thus the evidence obtained
from it), but conduct that goes to the legitimacy of police-citizen interaction.
As the District of Columbia Court of Appeals explained in a case involving
the admission of evidence of a defendant’s pre-arrest, uncharged crimes used
to explain the arresting officers’ states of mind:
It is unrealistic to expect the Government to truncate its case-in-chief by
utilizing only bare bones testimony about an arrest team stopping a citizen
merely because of the word from an officer far away. . . . [T]he Government
is entitled to present a thorough set of facts, to refine its case-in-chief to
rationally anticipate a factual issue that may create a reasonable doubt in the
minds of jurors. The use of [such prior crimes] evidence can serve this purpose, as it illuminates the practical context of the arrest itself. In drug cases,
[this] evidence (from the Government’s standpoint) could ostensibly ward
off the image of police officers stopping a citizen for no reason.19

This dynamic, the court observed, is commonplace: “The common law of this
jurisdiction now abounds with affirmances in criminal appeals that are very
similar to the instant case.”20
It is not just the government that seeks to draw attention to law enforcement officers’ motivations. When those motivations are suspect—even while
the officers’ actions meet the constitutional threshold—savvy defense attorneys seize upon them.21 Such is the dynamic wrought by the so-called objecnot offered for its truth); People v. Hernandez, 527 N.Y.S.2d 404, 407 (N.Y. App. Div.
1988) (holding, in prosecution for illegal possession of firearm, that the testimony of the
defendant’s neighbor that she had seen the defendant with a gun on prior occasions and
had alerted police accordingly was admissible both to prove the defendant’s dominion and
control over the gun found in his girlfriend’s car and “under the exception that permits
the introduction of such evidence as background material when necessary to provide a
‘complete picture’ of the events and, as in this case, to prevent speculation, as to why the
police stopped the defendant”).
19 Durham v. United States, 743 A.2d 196, 207 (D.C. 1999).
20 Id. at 206.
21 In the words of an experienced criminal defense attorney dispensing advice:
Another important issue to examine [before the jury] is the behavior of the
police and prosecution. When the defendant has been beaten, harassed or
abused by the police, these facts should be brought before the jury. . . . The fact
that the police have offended community values—or even themselves broken the
law—in a single-minded quest to arrest the defendant can be very persuasive,

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-2\NDL204.txt

698

unknown

Seq: 8

notre dame law review

26-JAN-17

11:35

[vol. 92:2

tive approach to Fourth Amendment reasonableness.22 Take the example of
pretextual stops or arrests, the fruits of which are admissible so long as the
stop or arrest was supported—even if not in fact precipitated—by adequate
cause (for a stop, reasonable suspicion, and for an arrest, probable cause).
In such cases, defense attorneys do their best to draw the jury’s attention to
the officer’s subjective motivations in making the stop or arrest, while prosecutors scramble to keep those motivations at bay.23 Courts struggle to find
the proper balance.24
Search and seizure are not the only areas that offer opportunities to
probe behind the scenes of the prosecution’s case. Law enforcement agents’
relationship with informants and cooperators is another well-trod ground of
evidentiary battle, in which the defense seeks to highlight any improper (or
simply questionable) behavior on the part of law enforcement, the prosecution attempts to scuttle the defense attack—by seeking to preclude or refute
the evidence,25 opting not to call vulnerable agents or informants to the
especially where police actions are less acceptable to the jurors than those of the
defendant.
Clay S. Conrad, Jury Nullification: The Lawyer’s Challenge, 24 CHAMPION 30, 36–37 (2000)
(citing Brown, supra note 7, at 1172–78). For a discussion of how enforcement-finding is
not in fact “nullification” as most commentators define that term, see infra subsection
III.A.4.
22 Throughout Fourth Amendment doctrine, courts assess the legality of conduct by
reference to an objectively reasonable officer rather than the subjective motivations of the
officer in question. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814 (1996) (“[T]he
Fourth Amendment’s concern with ‘reasonableness’ allows certain actions to be taken in
certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent.”).
23 As one defense attorney described the issue of pretextual stops:
In the courts, defense lawyers are struggling over such issues as . . . how to dismantle the testimony of police officers who are motivated by racial profiling
issues to build their cases against the people that they stop . . . .
....
. . . [O]ne of the primary tasks of a defense attorney in this area is determining
how to impeach the police officer’s actions in terms of their protocols, their technique, and their credibility. Essentially, you must have some knowledge of how
police work and function, and you cannot be afraid to call them liars, because
they are only human, and they have motives like everyone else.
Terry H. Gilbert, Overcoming the Challenges in Drug Crime Litigation: Considering the Long-Term
Implications for the Client, in DEFENSE STRATEGIES FOR DRUG CRIMES (Aspatore 2013), 2013
WL 5758089, at *2–3.
24 See, e.g., People v. Douglas, 680 N.Y.S.2d 145 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (allowing, in trial
for unlawful gun possession, defense counsel to question officers as to observations that
triggered the initial stop of the defendant, but ruling that prosecution was entitled to a jury
instruction that lawfulness of stop was not a matter for jury to decide); People v. Wright,
645 N.Y.S.2d 275 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996) (same).
25 See, e.g., United States v. Malpeso, 115 F.3d 155, 162–63 (2d Cir. 1997) (successfully
precluding evidence of an FBI agent’s disclosure of confidential law enforcement information to informant on the ground that it would unfairly prejudice government); People v.
Melendez, 439 N.Y.S.2d 923 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (holding that where cross-examination
of the detective was designed to implicate informant as accomplice in the homicide, the
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stand,26 or both—and courts are left to ferret out the point at which
prejudice becomes “unfair.”27 Nor are attacks on informants confined to
police and agents. In the hands of a deft defense attorney, cooperating witnesses and even uncharged accomplices are cast as undeserving beneficiaries
of prosecutorial mercy; and reasonable doubt becomes partly an inquiry into
prosecutorial judgment.28
prosecution was entitled to clarify the reason why the detective initially suspected the
informant and subsequently focused on the defendant), rev’d, 434 N.E.2d 1324 (N.Y.
1982).
26 A well-publicized example of this prosecutorial strategy arose in the “Africa Sting”
case—the notorious Foreign Corrupt Practices Act prosecution in which federal agents
engaged in improper conduct with the government’s main cooperating witness. A postmortem by several counsel in the trial discusses the prosecution strategy and defense
response:
In the weeks leading up to trial, we became convinced that, as a matter of
trial strategy, the government would not call its star cooperating witness . . . . [Or]
its own lead case agent . . . . [T]he government’s strategy . . . was to present a
sanitized version of the sting operation through witnesses who were several steps
removed from the operational decisions, thereby leaving us with little room to
bring out evidence of the investigation’s shortcomings.
To countermand this strategy, we asked the government witnesses . . . a series
of questions about strategic decisions relating to the [investigation]. If the
answer was “I don’t know,” the next question was always “Well, who would know?”
The answer was always the same: Agent Forvour. . . .[We] thought this strategy
would at least raise questions in the minds of the jurors as to why the government
never called [Forvour] . . . .
Eric Bruce et al., Inside the “Africa Sting” Trial: Anatomy of a Failed Prosecution, FCPA PROFESSOR (July 23, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/inside-the-africa-sting-trial-anatomy-ofa-failed-prosecution. The attorneys eventually called the case agent, a risky move that may
have paid off: the jury ultimately acquitted on some counts and hung on the remainder.
See id. A second trial yielded a similar result, and the government ultimately dismissed the
entire case. Id.
27 See FED. R. EVID . 403. Malpeso offers a ready illustration of inconsistencies that
result among trial courts attempting to distinguish fair from unfair prejudice in the context of law enforcement misconduct or unprofessionalism. See generally Malpeso, 115 F.3d
155. In a series of related organized crime cases before different judges in the Eastern
District of New York, two judges precluded evidence that an FBI agent leaked confidential
law enforcement information to an informant who was a member of a rival organized
crime family on the ground that it would unfairly prejudice the government, while a third
admitted the evidence. Id. at 162–63, 163 n.3. In the trial in which the evidence was
admitted, the jury acquitted, while in at least one trial in which the evidence was precluded, the jury convicted. Id. at 155, 162, 163 n.3. On appeal, the Second Circuit upheld
preclusion of the evidence as within the trial court’s discretion, notwithstanding the fact
that another court had reached a different conclusion. Id. at 163. Of course, the abuse of
discretion standard permits divergence among trial courts across a range of evidentiary
issues. But divergence is less principled when it comes to enforcement-finding, where trial
courts lack a useful framework for assessing whether prejudice to the government (or the
defense) is “fair.” See generally infra Section I.B.
28 The defense in the recent “Bridgegate” corruption trial—in which both accomplice
testimony and the actions of uncharged participants featured prominently—is a recent and
high-profile example of this oft-used strategy. See Corinne Ramey, Defense Grills Star Witness
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Consider, too, the matter of investigatory competence. In a system in
which law enforcement is the sole investigator of crimes, the question of guilt
will often hinge on the jury’s assessment of law enforcement’s adequacy.
And, because the vast majority of jurors have no personal experience with the
task of investigating and gathering evidence in a criminal case, what constitutes “adequate” becomes contestable—and frequently contested. Defense
attorneys point to leads unfollowed, witnesses unquestioned, tests not
done.29 Prosecutors elicit testimony designed to explain those decisions,30
or seek to minimize their importance through jury instructions that the prosecution is “not on trial,” and “investigative techniques are not your conin Bridge Trial, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/witness-christieassociates-compared-their-jobs-to-fixers-in-pulp-fiction-1475079325 (reporting that the
defense’s “central argument” is that “[i]t was [the government’s witness], and not [the
defendant], who was actually in charge . . . .”); Kate Zernike, Bridge Case Verdict May Hinge
on Officials Who Weren’t Tried, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/
11/01/nyregion/bridgegate-case-chris-christie-deliberations.html (“[W]ill jurors decide, in
the memorable words of [one defendant’s closing argument], that prosecutors went after a
whale and ended up with a minnow?”); see also, e.g., Barry Tarlow, RICO Report: Adventures of
Sal and Willie: Stunning Acquittals Condemn Prosecutorial Abuse of Power, 20 CHAMPION 39, 42
(1996). Tarlow noted that a successful defense strategy in a federal tax fraud case involving twenty-seven informant witnesses was to “denounc[e] the prosecution’s monopolistic
power to dictate disproportionately low sentences in exchange for informer testimony,”
and argue to the jury that “[t]here is something wrong when, in a democracy, . . . one
man. . . not elected. . . , a young prosecutor in his thirties . . . has power over the life and
death of so many human beings.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation
omitted).
29 E.g., State v. Stringfellow, 42 A.3d 27, 30 (Md. 2012) (noting the defense strategy of
drawing the jury’s attention to the state’s failure to test the gun for the defendant’s latent
fingerprints); Evans v. State, 922 A.2d 620, 628 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007) (describing the
defense strategy of highlighting the absence of audio and video recordings of drug transactions, with defense counsel exhorting the jury that detectives “could have broken out a
video camera, worn an audio” and insisting that “would have been a cross-check of reliability”); People v. Slack, No. 219218, 2001 WL 714812, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2001)
(per curiam) (noting how the detective “explained why his investigation did not include
interviews with other witnesses and the failure to attempt to obtain fingerprints from the
stolen vehicle”). In the words of a criminal defense attorney dispensing trial strategy
advice:
In some cases, the police officers in a criminal defense case are the defendant’s
best witnesses and you can use them to develop your theme. . . . Sometimes the
lack of findings by the investigating agency can strengthen your theme—the lack
of fingerprints, a confession, or eyewitnesses. All these things can be brought out
by you during cross-examination of police officers, or even calling the police yourself. It gives your case more credibility.
Andrew R. Miller, Succeeding as a Criminal Defense Lawyer: Preparing Your Case Theory, in
TRIAL TECHNIQUES FOR CRIMINAL CASES (Aspatore 2010), 2010 WL 3252491, at *12.
30 See, e.g., United States v. Cruz-Diaz, 550 F.3d 169, 178–79 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding,
in response to defense counsel’s focus on the police officers’ failure to gather fingerprint
or DNA evidence from the robbery getaway car, that prosecution was entitled to elicit evidence of co-defendant’s confession notwithstanding Bruton or Crawford, “to rebut [defendant]’s attempt to cast doubt on the integrity of the government’s investigatory efforts”).
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cern.”31 Courts vacillate in their approaches, both as to probes of
investigatory adequacy and jury instructions on how to consider such
evidence.32
The reality, though, is that law enforcement is on trial. As George Fisher
has observed with respect to the O.J. Simpson trial, the overarching courtroom dynamic in that case was merely an amplified version of what takes
place in criminal courtrooms every day:
[I]n the average case the prosecutor would be so anxious to preserve the
illusion of police professionalism that she would leave such defense arguments [about how the police failed to look for certain physical evidence]
unanswered rather than give the truthful, innocent, but devastating
response that the cops just didn’t bother to do something. And defense
lawyers, recognizing the prosecutor’s predicament, press the advantage.
Rarely does a defense lawyer let an entire case go by without telling the jury
how weighty is the power of the state that has been brought to bear against
his lonely client.
....
Almost every criminal trial presents a variation of [this] tactic[ ]. The
defense hangs the cops around the prosecutor’s neck.33
31 The Second Circuit, for instance, has upheld variants on the instruction that:
There is no legal requirement that the government prove its case by any particular means. While you are to carefully consider the evidence presented by the
government, you need not speculate as to why certain techniques were used or
why others were not used. The government is not on trial, and law enforcement
techniques are not your concern.
Your sole concern is to determine whether or not, based on the evidence or
lack of evidence, the guilt of the defendant has been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.
United States v. Barcelo, No. 13-cr-38, 2014 WL 4058066, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2014)
(quoting Transcript of Record at 1403:11–19, United States v. Barcelo, No. 1:13-cr-00038
(Feb. 29, 2014)); see United States v. Barcelo, 628 Fed. App’x 36 (2d Cir. 2015) (affirming
the instructions).
32 On investigatory adequacy, compare cases cited supra note 29 with United States v.
Patrick, 248 F.3d 11, 22–23, 22 n.10 (1st Cir. 2001), upholding the trial court’s exclusion of
the detective’s failure to follow up on an informant tip pointing to an alternative suspect.
On jury instructions, compare Barcelo, 2014 WL 4058066, at *13, and Evans, 922 A.2d at
632, upholding an instruction that the defendant, not the government, is on trial, with
United States v. Pritchard, 485 F. App’x 199, 201 (9th Cir. 2012), finding error in the trial
court’s instruction to the jury that “[t]he investigation [of the government] is not on trial
here; the defendants are,” and Robinson v. State, 84 A.3d 69, 79–81 (Md. 2014), without
overruling Evans, limiting such instructions to instances where defense counsel has misstated the law or the state’s burden, or speculated as to what the unperformed investigative
work would have shown.
33 George Fisher, The O.J. Simpson Corpus, 49 STAN. L. REV. 971, 991–92 (1997). In
addition to this defense tactic Fisher identifies a common prosecution tactic, also exemplified in the O.J. Simpson trial, of “hang[ing] the defendant’s silence around defense counsel’s neck.” Id. at 992 (discussing how prosecutors can “spin out [a] sinister account of the
evidence and . . . wonder aloud what other explanation there might be, silently encouraging the jury to speculate about why the defendant did not step forward to explain”).
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This reality infects not only the evidence and argument presented at trial, but
the disclosures that precede it. Indeed, an entire class of Brady violations
arises from prosecutors’ efforts to mitigate (or avoid entirely) attacks on law
enforcement’s adequacy.34
It also infects pre-trial resolutions, perhaps even more than trials.
Because while it is difficult to quantify enforcement-finding’s effects on
actual trial outcomes,35 in a system dominated by non-trial outcomes such
effects may be beside the point. For purposes of plea bargaining, it is prosecutors’ and defense attorneys’ perception of enforcement-finding’s influence
that matters most. As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the perception
on both sides is that the jury’s evaluation of law enforcement can and does
influence its evaluation of guilt.36 And indeed, those who try and bargain
criminal cases interpret verdicts as a product of this reality.37 The price of a
non-trial resolution, in short, can be heavily influenced by the parties’ assessment of how the jury will evaluate law enforcement. As an observer of plea
34 See, e.g., United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that
undisclosed errors in police reports that, if corrected, would have tended to inculpate the
defendant were nevertheless exculpatory in that such errors were “evidence of a flawed
police investigation” that would have presented the defense “the opportunity to attack the
thoroughness, and even good faith, of the investigation,” a fact the government acknowledged in its brief); United States v. Aguilar, 831 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1203 (C.D. Cal. 2011)
(noting the prosecution’s admission that, in failing to disclose agent’s grand jury testimony, it sought to avoid utilizing a particular witness in order “to limit the [Defendants’]
ability to introduce [a] type of defense” that would “put the investigation on trial . . . .”
(alterations in original) (citation omitted)); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 445–47
(1995) (deciding that contradictory statements made by the state’s key witness to police
constituted material, exculpatory information because by examining police’s knowledge of
the inconsistencies, defense could have “attacked the reliability of the investigation”);
Bowen v. Maynard, 799 F.2d 593, 613 (10th Cir. 1986) (“A common trial tactic of defense
lawyers is to discredit the caliber of the investigation or the decision to charge the defendant, and we may consider such [evidence] in assessing a possible Brady violation.”).
35 Verdicts come without formal explanations, and, as noted infra note 61, empirical
study of the causes of trial outcomes is notoriously difficult. It is for this reason that most
empirical work focuses on juror pre-deliberation views, first votes, or juror-judge disagreement as opposed to the causes of acquittals, non-verdicts, or mixed verdicts. See infra note
42.
36 See supra notes 16–31, 34 and accompanying text.
37 See, e.g., Chris Herring, Bronx Acquittals Set Record, WALL ST. J. (May 4, 2010), http://
online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704608104575221271762806324 (quoting a Bronx defense attorney’s assessment that “[t]he Bronx has a healthy mistrust for the
police and that has a part in why there are so many acquittals”); Dan Morrison, Odds on
Rumble in the Bronx, NEWSDAY, Mar. 22, 1996, at A26 (noting that former Bronx District
Attorney Mario Merola attributed the low trial conviction rate in part to minority communities’ distrust of police); John Simerman, Orleans Parish Conviction Rates in Jury Trials Hold
Steady, and Relatively Low, TIMES–PICAYUNE (Jan. 16, 2012), http://www.nola.com/crime/
index.ssf/2012/01/orleans_parish_conviction_rate.html (reporting that observers in the
system attribute New Orleans’ perennially low criminal trial conviction rate to jurors’ mistrust of police testimony).
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bargaining in the Chicago criminal courts in the early 2000s described the
plea bargaining process there:
“[D]iscovery” consists mostly of police reports regarding the alleged [crime].
Before the next court date, the defense lawyers will study the reports for
inconsistencies and omissions. A glaring error can cause a lawyer to advise
his client to gamble on a trial; a minor flaw can at least be brought up in plea
discussions when trying to extract a markdown from the state. Even an airtight police report helps the defense lawyer: he can use it to persuade his
client to wave the white flag and grab the state’s best offer.38

Criminal trials may be vanishing, but their outcomes—or, more to the
point, defense lawyers’ and prosecutors’ interpretations of them—still exert a
powerful influence on plea bargaining,39 not to mention on prosecutors’
decisions to dismiss or to decline charging in the first place.40
2.

The Empirical Perspective

Few empirical studies have sought to ascertain the extent and scope of
jury evaluation of law enforcement, and how such evaluations affect decisionmaking and outcomes. This is no doubt in part due to scholars’ reliance on
the traditional fact/law framework. Because we haven’t identified and
38 STEVE BOGIRA, COURTROOM 302: A YEAR BEHIND THE SCENES IN AN AMERICAN CRIMICOURTHOUSE 35–36 (2005).
39 See, e.g., Gilbert, supra note 23, at *3 (“[O]ne of the primary tasks of a defense
attorney . . . is determining how to impeach the police officer’s actions in terms of their
protocols, their technique, and their credibility . . . . [G]o after law enforcement aggressively. If you are able to find some holes in their case and raise some appealable issues to
give yourself some increased leverage, then you may be able to get a better plea bargain for
your client.”).
40 Empirical proof of enforcement-finding’s effect on dismissal and charging patterns
is elusive, not least due to the paucity of data on charging and dismissal patterns generally.
One can point to jurisdictions with notoriously poor police-community relations and low
conviction rates—the Bronx, New Orleans, or Philadelphia, for example—as circumstantial evidence. Such outcomes are also, of course, reflections of other pathologies, including court delays, witness non-appearance, and overloaded prosecutorial dockets.
Every so often, though, enforcement-finding’s repercussions surface. They did so
recently in Florida, for example, where discovery of a series of racist emails and videos sent
by local police officers in Miami Beach and Fort Lauderdale, respectively, prompted prosecutors to reopen concluded cases and dismiss pending ones in which the officers were
implicated. See Mike Clary & Tonya Alanez, Prosecutors Dismiss Cases Linked to Racist Ex-Fort
Lauderdale Cops, SUN SENTINEL (Apr. 10, 2015), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/local/broward/fl-racist-cops-case-dismissals-20150409-story.html; Frances Robles, Racist Police Emails
Put Florida Cases in Doubt, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/
16/us/miami-prosecutor-reviews-cases-of-police-officers-who-sent-racist-emails.html. Notably, none of the emails and videos concerned the cases themselves—rather, they were
extraneous communications that, in prosecutors’ views, would be relevant to any case in
which the officers testified, particularly those involving minority defendants. In the case of
the Fort Lauderdale officers, prosecutors ultimately declined to prosecute twelve felony
cases (at last count) in which the implicated officers would have been witnesses. See id.

NAL
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accounted for enforcement-finding as a conceptually distinct process,41 it
tends to lurk in the background rather than the forefront of most jury studies. Yet recent empirical inroads in this area are promising, and at the very
least confirm litigants’ and judges’ intuitions to be well-founded. The nascent empirical work also sketches a picture of enforcement-finding’s multilayered, intricate processes. Embedded in jury evaluations of law enforcement are, among other things, perceptions of police legitimacy in general;
perceptions of testifying officers’ credibility in particular; perceptions of law
enforcement motives; and jurors’ race.
Utilizing the largest dataset of juror decisionmaking in actual (nonmock) criminal trials in recent times—from over 200 felony trials in four
large urban jurisdictions—one group of researchers found a significant correlation between jurors’ trust in police and their pre-deliberation predispositions and first votes.42 Holding certain other juror characteristics and casespecific variables constant, the study authors found that jurors reporting a
high level of trust and confidence in police had a 75% likelihood of favoring
the prosecution prior to deliberations, while jurors reporting no trust and
confidence in the police had just a 47% pre-deliberation probability of favoring the prosecution.43 More remarkably, jurors’ assessment of police witnesses’ believability44 had a greater correlation with first votes than most
other juror assessments, including as to fairness of the law and consequences
to the defendant. In fact, the only factors that had a greater correlation with
juror first votes were the judge’s assessment of the strength of the evidence—
which invariably reflected her assessment of the believability of police witnesses, among other evidence—and the jurors’ race.45
41 See infra Section I.B.
42 See Farrell et al., supra note 13, at 779, 783–88. The study relied on data collected in
2003 by the National Center for State Courts, which queried nearly 2000 jurors who had
collectively served on 210 separate, non-capital felony cases in four different urban jurisdictions: Washington, D.C.; Bronx, New York; Los Angeles County, California; and Maricopa
County, Arizona. Id. at 778–79, 783. Following the trial, jurors were asked a series of
questions regarding their views on the law, the evidence, law enforcement (primarily the
police), and the courts. Questionnaires were administered post-trial out of concern for
confidentiality and the defendants’ fair trial right. See id. at 779 n.3. The study, as well as
another of the same dataset, focused on jurors’ first votes rather than final votes presumably to control for the effect of group dynamics on jurors’ decisionmaking. See Stephen P.
Garvey et al., Juror First Votes in Criminal Trials, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 371, 373–74
(2004).
43 Farrell et al., supra note 13, at 786.
44 The extent to which jurors believed the police was a control variable in the study,
allowing the researchers to assess the effect of jurors’ perceptions of police legitimacy independent of their opinions about the particular police witnesses in the case. Id. at 780. The
study did not seek to ascertain the existence or degree of a causal relationship between
jurors’ trust in police and their belief of police testimony, though it did find that police
believability mediated the effects of juror trust and confidence in police on pre-deliberation predisposition and first votes. Id. at 784–87.
45 Id. at 490 tbl.4.
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Yet, as that study further revealed, race is itself deeply entangled with
both trust and believability. The profound racial gap in perceptions of police
legitimacy (documented both in the study and elsewhere)46 may account, in
large part, for the profound racial disparities in jurors’ predispositions and
first votes. Black jurors, who on the whole were more predisposed to acquit
and more likely to vote to acquit than white jurors, were also on the whole
more police-sensitive: the correlations between black jurors’ trust in police
and both their predisposition and first votes was greater than for whites.47
Additionally, the racial gap in predisposition and first votes narrowed significantly as black jurors’ trust and confidence in police rose.48 Perhaps most
notable was the magnitude of the police’s effect on black jurors’ verdict predispositions: a black juror with low trust and confidence in the police had
only a 36% probability of favoring the prosecution, while a black juror with
high trust and confidence in the police had a 70% chance of favoring the
prosecution.49
Another study of the same juror dataset highlighted different aspects of
the police/juror dynamic.50 Assessing the interplay of attitudinal factors and
race, researchers found that assessment of police believability consistently
ranked as the factor most correlated with first votes—exceeding both race
(the jurors’ and the defendants’) and other attitudinal factors.51 Notably,
46 See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 71 (1997) (“Large numbers of
blacks are convinced that, in general, law enforcement authorities value the safety and wellbeing of whites more than that of blacks.”); Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and
Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457,
458–63, 482, 499 (2000); Ronald Weitzer, Racialized Policing: Residents’ Perceptions in Three
Neighborhoods, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 129, 151–52 (2000) (demonstrating that blacks in lowincome, high-crime neighborhoods perceived themselves as receiving inferior treatment by
police as compared to both blacks and whites in higher-income, lower-crime neighborhoods). The rise of the Black Lives Matter movement is the most recent manifestation of a
longstanding, well-documented disaffection between the black community and the police.
47 See Farrell et al., supra note 13, at 789.
48 See id. The example the authors offer explains it best:
[W]hen white jurors have little trust and confidence in the police . . ., there is a
71 percent probability that they will favor the prosecution. For black jurors at the
same low level of trust and confidence in the police . . ., there is only a 36 percent
probability that they will favor the prosecution, a 35-point gap between white and
black probabilities of favoring the prosecution. When white jurors have high
trust and confidence in the police . . ., there is an 89 percent probability that they
will favor the prosecution. At the same high level of trust for black jurors, there is
a 70 percent probability that they will favor the prosecution. While black and
white jurors do not have identical levels of favoring the prosecution even at high
levels of police trust, the racial gap has narrowed from a 35-point to a 19-point
difference.
Id.
49 Id.
50 See Garvey et al., supra note 42.
51 Id. at 381 tbl.4. Where race of jurors and defendants was factored into the models,
the only statistically significant predictors of juror first votes in favor of the prosecution
were: (i) race, but only for black jurors adjudicating minority defendants (beta –.378); (ii)
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for victimless crimes (the large majority of which were narcotics offenses),
jurors’ assessments of police believability was the only statistically significant
attitudinal factor once jurors’ and defendants’ race was taken into account.52
Finally, another study, though not of juries, offers important insights
into the importance of law enforcement motives to citizens’ willingness to
acquit. In a series of experiments designed to test the strength of the exclusionary rule’s twin rationales (judicial integrity and police deterrence), participants were given investigative scenarios and asked if they would exclude
the seized evidence knowing exclusion would result in acquittal.53 The scenarios were then manipulated to test the relationship between willingness to
exclude and police officers’ underlying motives in effectuating the seizure.54
The study participants were statistically more willing to exclude—and thus, to
acquit—when the officers’ decisions to stop, search, or arrest were motivated
by race or corruption.55 Effectively, malevolent motives on the part of law
enforcement increased willingness to acquit.
Though each of these studies is quite recent, the phenomenon is not. In
fact, it was empirically documented as early as sixty years ago. The American
Jury earned its fame, and lasting impact, for its study of the possible sources
of juror-judge disagreement on verdicts.56 Yet in the process, the authors
made important—yet relatively unnoticed—observations about the ways in
which jurors assessed law enforcement. Judges, the authors reported,
observed that jurors’ verdicts sometimes reflected dissatisfaction with even
lawful police behavior. Thus, juries were reported to have hung or acquitted
legal fairness (beta .281); (iii) harshness of consequences to the defendant (beta –.404);
and (iv) believability of police testimony (beta .887).
52 Id. at 382–85, 384 tbl.5. For victimless crimes, among the statistically significant
predictors of a first vote in favor of conviction were police believability (beta 1.358); race
(black juror-minority defendant only, beta –.606); and age of juror (beta .126). Id. at 384
tbl.5. Of victimless cases in the sample, 73% were narcotics offenses. Id. at 383. The study
authors also assessed each jurisdiction separately. There, too, police believability remained
a statistically significant predictor of first votes. Id. at 385–95.
53 See Kenworthey Bilz, Dirty Hands or Deterrence? An Experimental Examination of the
Exclusionary Rule, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 149, 155–65 (2012).
54 Id.
55 Id. In the first experiment, where desire to exclude was measured on a six-point
Likert-type ascending scale (higher numbers reflect greater desire to exclude), the mean
desire to exclude for a racially-motivated seizure was 4.8, the mean desire to exclude for
corrupt seizure was 4.4, and the mean desire to exclude for a good-faith blunder was 4.0.
Id. at 155–56. In the second experiment, measured on a ten-point Likert-type ascending
scale, the mean desire to exclude for a racially-motivated seizure was 8.1, while the mean
desire to exclude for a good-faith blunder was 7.0. Id. at 158.
56 HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 11 (1966). This was the
study’s aim, and it became known primarily for the authors’ “liberation hypothesis,” the
theory that in close cases, jurors more often than judges are “liberated” to consider extraevidentiary factors, such as sentiments about the law or the defendant. See, e.g., Amy Farrell & Daniel Givelber, Liberation Reconsidered: Understanding Why Judges and Juries Disagree
About Guilt, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1549 (2010) (discussing courts’ and scholars’
focus on the study’s liberation hypothesis).
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in instances where the police had engaged in overzealous targeting (notwithstanding that the conduct fell short of entrapment) or arrest (notwithstanding the existence of legal grounds for arrest).57 And though the study was
conducted in the decade before Miranda, juries sometimes imposed their
own requirements on police interrogation.58 The passage of time since
Kalven and Zeisel’s study has likely only exacerbated the phenomenon they
observed.59
For a phenomenon so deeply rooted in the fabric of criminal litigation,
the dearth of empirical work is unfortunate. The recent scholarly attention
to this area is heartening, and much remains to be studied, including the
interplay of trial events with jurors’ pre-trial perceptions of legitimacy, the
relationship between pre-trial perceptions of police and belief in police testimony, and the effect of jury evaluations on deliberation and verdicts.60 And,
as with all empirical work on juries, these recent studies must be approached
with caution.61
57 KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 56, at 321–22.
58 Kalven and Zeisel found one judge’s comment illustrative of this observed dynamic:
Principal witnesses were [State] Bureau of Investigation men. They may not
have been as careful as they should have been in advising defendant of his rights,
and letting him see an attorney speedily. I admitted a statement obtained from
him, over objection, but enough was presented to jury to give impression that
there might have been an attempt to railroad him, so to speak. Attempt was not
bad, but there was a little odor.
Id. at 320 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
59 Police departments today are bigger, and the law enforcement role in investigations
and case preparation greater, than was the case in the 1950s. Compare NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH, THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 106 (1967), with FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORT: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2013, at tbl.70, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/
2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/tables/table-70/table_70_full_time_law_enforcement_employ
ees_by_region_and_geographic_division_by_rate_2013.xls (showing national rate of law
enforcement personnel, per 1000 citizens, as 1.7 in 1967 and 2.8 in 2013). And though the
study antedated Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which imposed the exclusionary rule
on state courts, Mapp may not have had an appreciable effect on Kalven & Zeisel’s observations, at least relative to today. First, a majority of sampled cases (59.2%) were in jurisdictions that had already adopted the exclusionary rule. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 56,
at 37–38 (listing states in sample); E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Modern Status of Rule Governing Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by Unlawful Search and Seizure, 50 A.L.R.2d 531, § 2[a]
(1956) (compiling listing of states that had adopted the exclusionary rule). Second, the
exclusionary remedy today is infrequently imposed even in circumstances involving unconstitutional police conduct. See infra notes 137–38 and accompanying text.
60 The dataset from the National Center for State Courts does not allow for those
analyses; more data collection is required. For information on the datasets, see Paula L.
Hannaford-Agor et al., Nat’l Archive of Criminal Justice Data, Evaluation of Hung Juries in
Bronx County, New York, Los Angeles County, California, Maricopa County, Arizona, and Washington, DC, 2000–2001 (ICPSR Study No. 3689, 2003), http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR03689
.v1.
61 Post-trial investigations of jurors’ pre-trial attitudes cannot control for the effects of
the trial. See Farrell et al., supra note 13, at 794 (noting that in studies of real juries,
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At least for now, though, this much we know: enforcement-finding is
real, influential, and complex. Courts’ and litigants’ attention to it, then, is
neither surprising nor overblown. The question is whether we are attending
to enforcement-finding appropriately in light of how it operates, why it exists,
and the functions it serves.
B.

The Conceptual Gap

The answer, in short, is no. Though enforcement-finding permeates
criminal adjudication, we lack a coherent and appropriate approach to it. As
the foregoing discussion and case examples illustrate, courts—both state and
federal—are all over the map. Some encourage juror skepticism of law
enforcement, liberally admitting evidence and argument to that end.62
Others consider juror evaluation of law enforcement an unfortunate reality,
permitting evidence and argument that bears on it with resignation.63 Still
others resist it, imploring the parties and the jury to keep their focus on the
acts of the defendant rather than those of police and prosecutors.64 Even
within the same jurisdiction, approaches to enforcement-finding vary.65 And
these are just the rulings we know about. The “dataset” of evidentiary rulings
in criminal cases is necessarily limited by a combination of appellate asymmetry (defendants regularly appeal convictions while the prosecution may not
appeal acquittals) and a dearth of published evidentiary rulings by trial
courts.66
The rulings we can see, though, reveal a framing problem at the heart of
these inconsistencies. Courts approach admissibility as a question of law verdefendants’ rights prevent researchers from posing pre-trial questions to jurors, thus
obscuring the extent to which jurors’ post-trial responses were influenced by the trial
itself). For that matter, it is impossible even to identify, let alone control for, every variable
potentially influencing juror decisionmaking. See, e.g., John R. Hepburn, The Objective Reality of Evidence and the Utility of Systematic Jury Selection, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89, 90 (1980)
(discussing the difficulties of accounting for and isolating variables in jury research).
Indeed, jurors themselves may be unaware of the factors influencing their reasoning and
the extent of that influence. See Hannaford-Agor & Hans, supra note 7, at 1264 (“Indeed,
some psychologists would argue that it is unlikely that the majority of jurors would be able
to say with any certainty which specific factors led them to their decision.” (citing RICHARD
NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF HUMAN JUDGMENT (1980))).
62 See, e.g., supra note 34 (discussing cases).
63 See, e.g., supra notes 19–20 (discussing Durham v. United States).
64 See, e.g., supra note 31 (discussing United States v. Barcelo).
65 See, e.g., supra note 32 (noting the needle-threading among Maryland’s courts on
the “specific investigative techniques” instruction). Compare People v. Hernandez, 527
N.Y.S.2d 404 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988), discussed supra note 18, with People v. Wright, 645
N.Y.S.2d 275 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996), discussed supra note 24 (two New York cases reaching
different conclusions on the permissible purpose of evidence as to police motivation for
stopping a defendant).
66 As a result, the “dataset” skews heavily towards rulings that benefit the prosecution
and curtail the defense. This is particularly the case in state courts, where published trial
court opinions are exceedingly rare.
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sus fact. Thus, evaluations of law enforcement categorized as within the
jury’s fact-finding role—that is, evaluations that bear on guilt, such as a testifying officer’s credibility, or law enforcement conduct that impacts the reliability of evidence—are generally permissible; while evaluations categorized as
within the jury’s (now prohibited) law-finding role—that is, evaluations that
bear on the lawfulness or desirability of law enforcers’ conduct—are not.67
Scholars subscribe to the framework, too. While many diverge from courts
on the question of law-finding’s permissibility in the context of undesirable law
enforcement conduct, none challenge the framework itself.68
This acquiescence to the law/fact framework is understandable; as
frameworks go, it is intuitively appealing. But it is also surprisingly unhelpful,
because when it comes to evaluating law enforcement, the distinction
between “law” and “fact” is never so neat. This is not merely because juries
both find facts and apply them to law. To the contrary, when it comes to
evaluating law enforcement, facts typically aren’t applied to law—at least, not
in the traditional sense of “law” as instructed by the trial court.69 Instead, the
inutility of the fact/law distinction arises for three reasons unique to the
enforcement-finding task.
First, a law enforcement officer’s credibility is, in practice, often linked
with jurors’ normative assessments of the officer’s conduct. Take, for example, a police officer’s decision to approach or stop a defendant. While the
basis for that decision is not generally an issue the jury need decide, neither
can credibility be determined in a vacuum. If the defendant was stopped
nominally because he failed to signal upon making a turn, but primarily
because, as a black motorist in an expensive car he seemed “suspicious,” one
would be hard-pressed to find a police officer who would admit as much on
the witness stand (or even privately to the prosecutor in the first instance). If
he did, the officer’s testimony would be credible in the sense of not appearing
fabricated; yet his motivations would render him untrustworthy.70
This is why it is often difficult to separate (though courts sometimes try)
questions of conduct from credibility.71 The normative desirability of the
67 See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 196 F.3d 910, 914 (8th Cir. 1999). The court
upheld the district court’s instruction to jury—in police stop of a car based ostensibly on a
broken tail light where evidence of the broken tail light was questionable—that “as a matter of law . . . the stop of the defendant’s vehicle, the subsequent search of the container in
which the gun was found, and the seizure of the gun and items found in the cab were all
lawful acts of the law enforcement officer performing law enforcement duties.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted); see also Wright, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 276 (permitting defense questioning of officers as to basis for their approaching defendant on
theory that such inquiry goes to credibility of officers, while instructing the jury that lawfulness of the stop was not a matter for the jury to decide).
68 See supra note 7.
69 See infra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.
70 See supra notes 16–20 and accompanying text. Indeed, this reality explains Broward
County prosecutors’ decision to dismiss cases in which lawful stops were nevertheless the
product of potentially suspect motivations. See supra note 40.
71 See, e.g., Wright, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 276.
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underlying conduct influences the likelihood of the officer’s truthful
recounting of it. Why lie, after all, if there is nothing to hide? By the same
token, why hide facts unless they are unfavorable? The political economy of
the criminal jury trial—and the role enforcement-finding plays in it—
imposes pressures on prosecutors to validate police action, even when judges
might otherwise limit defense attacks on it. And when police action falls
short of a jury’s perceived expectations, it gives rise to a temptation to lie.72
Second, the “law” governing law enforcement conduct occupies a fundamentally different position, with respect to the jury’s role, from the “law”
governing the defendant’s conduct. In acquitting (or partially acquitting) a
defendant whose proven conduct a legislature has defined as criminal, a jury
necessarily rejects or refines that legislation, at least as applied in the circumstances at hand. By contrast, in evaluating the actions of those who have
investigated and charged the defendant, and in acquitting (or partially
acquitting) a defendant based, in part, on those law enforcement actions, a
jury does not necessarily reject or refine the law governing the defendant’s
actions. Rather, it rejects the means by which the law was enforced.73 Nor
does the jury reject or refine the law governing police behavior. That law—
almost entirely judge-made74—merely sets the floor of permissible law
enforcement conduct, and imposes remedies for transgression.75 It imposes
no rules as to the weight a jury should accord admitted evidence, nor does it
obligate the jury to accept the methods or processes by which the evidence
was obtained.
Research indicates that citizens evaluate police based on metrics outside
the rubric of constitutional rights—for instance, perceptions of fairness
(whether the police have acted neutrally, consistently, and transparently),
treatment (whether the police have treated citizens with dignity, respect, and
politeness), and benevolence (whether the officers’ motivations are sincere,
benevolent, and well-intentioned).76 Put differently, what police and prose72 See Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1045–48 (1996) (recounting empirical data on police perjury in suppression hearings and postulating its causes). While the “testilying” dynamic has been
explored principally with respect to suppression hearings, the same precipitating dynamic
exists at trial. The pre-trial pressures on police and prosecutors to guard against the exclusion of evidence become, at the trial stage, a related (but distinct) pressure to present the
jury with a picture of admirable police work.
73 For a more detailed discussion of how enforcement-finding differs from nullification, see infra subsection III.A.4.
74 See generally Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1975).
75 See Tracey L. Meares, The Good Cop: Knowing the Difference Between Lawful or Effective
Policing and Rightful Policing—and Why It Matters, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1865, 1867 (2013)
(“Much of [constitutional criminal procedure] specifies remedies for rule transgression. It
is, in other words, primarily about redressing the illegitimate exercise of power.”); Carol S.
Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers,
94 MICH. L. REV. 2466 (1996).
76 See Meares, supra note 75, at 1875–76. The social science evidence Meares discusses
pertains primarily to citizens’ evaluations of their own interactions with law enforcement.
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cutors may do is a separate inquiry from what they should do. A jury may
assess the latter without rejecting or refining a court’s assessment of the
former.77
Third, any fact-finding about law enforcement—whether it bears primarily on guilt or on the propriety of law enforcement’s conduct—entails more
than simply a determination of what happened. It implicates a normative
judgment. If the police did (or did not do) x, should they have done (or not
done) x?78 What are the implications of police action (or inaction) for the
other evidence in the case? What are the implications for the jury’s trust and
confidence in the prosecution’s case, and for reasonable doubt? These sorts
of questions do not implicate the validity or desirability of laws, but nor are
they limited to ascertaining historical fact.
If we were to visualize the fact/law continuum as a paved path, enforcement-finding is its unmarked companion trail; it weaves in and out of the
paved path, and beyond it. It is little wonder that, in practice, the law/fact
framework can operate as a judicial straightjacket rather than an aid: courts
categorize (or miscategorize) evidence or argument as needed to support
their rulings on admissibility, rather than the other way around.79 Distinguishing evidence pertinent to guilt from that pertinent to law enforcement
conduct, categorizing the focus on law enforcement motivations as alternatively “completing” the factual story (if courts wish to allow it) or appealing to
“nullification” (if they don’t), are analyses that all traffic in a false dichotomy.
In practice, enforcement-finding is intrinsic to reasonable doubt even while it
asks jurors to think beyond it.
In short, the framework used to set enforcement-finding’s proper scope
is not equipped for the task. Rather than trying to distinguish between “fact”
and “law,” we should ask a more foundational question: What is the jury’s
institutional function, and does enforcement-finding serve it? Such an
inquiry requires placing the jury’s role, and enforcement-finding, in historiWe might suppose, though it has yet to be proven, that jurors use similar metrics to assess
law enforcement treatment of suspects and defendants.
77 For a discussion of how enforcement-finding by juries compliments rather than
undermines the judicial function in constitutional criminal procedure, see infra subsection
III.A.4.
78 Note this is different from the normative inquiry of law-finding, in which the jury
asks whether the defendant’s conduct, though clearly undesirable, merits legal sanction.
When evaluating law enforcement conduct, the jury focuses on whether the conduct is
desirable notwithstanding its legality.
79 See, e.g., Durham v. United States, 743 A.2d 196, 207 (D.C. 1999), discussed supra
note 19 and accompanying text (describing motivations behind officer’s decision to stop
defendant as admissible “to present a thorough set of facts, to refine [the prosecution’s]
case-in-chief to rationally anticipate a factual issue that may create a reasonable doubt in
the minds of jurors,” while acknowledging several sentences later that the purpose of Toliver evidence is to “ward off the image of police officers stopping a citizen for no reason”);
People v. Wright, 645 N.Y.S.2d 275 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996), discussed supra note 24 (admitting
evidence of officer’s motivations in stopping defendant as relevant to “credibility,” while
curtailing defense efforts to question those motivations as entreaties to “nullification”).
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cal context. It wasn’t, after all, always the case that juries decided facts while
judges decided law.80 It wasn’t even always the case that juries actually
decided facts.81 And it wasn’t always the case that juries evaluated law
enforcement.82 To the contrary, “law enforcement,” as we know it, is a fairly
recent phenomenon. To set enforcement-finding’s boundaries, we must first
understand why and how it grew so sizably in the first place. The next Part
undertakes that task.
II. ENFORCEMENT-FINDING’S RISE
From the Founding to the present day, criminal law and its enforcement
underwent radical transformation. So did juries. This Part charts these
transformations and their interrelationship, revealing two key insights. First,
the jury’s role is dynamic. It evolves in relation to the criminal enforcement
environment in which it functions. Second, enforcement-finding is an adaptation in that evolutionary process. In these respects, enforcement-finding is
both inevitable and necessary.
Two caveats are in order. First, the history offered here is neither
detailed nor new. My contribution is context. By examining the jury’s role
in relation to changes in criminal law and enforcement, I expose enforcement-finding as an ingrained and even desirable feature, rather than a flaw,
of contemporary criminal adjudication.
Second, broad themes in criminal justice are inherently problematic,
because American criminal justice is, and has always been, distinctly local.
For every trend here described there are jurisdictions that bucked it; for
every broad categorization there will be cases that do not fit. Those seeking
more fine-grained analyses will find them in the many sources cited in this
Part. The aim here is to digest and extract from these richly detailed sources
insights into the criminal jury’s enforcement-finding role.
The Part proceeds as follows. Section A focuses on four principal
changes in criminal law and enforcement: the mitigation of punishment;
codification and the growth of criminal statutes; the rise of professionalized
criminal enforcement; and the adoption and subsequent contraction of the
exclusionary rule. Section B considers three major transformations within
criminal adjudication: the allocation of law-finding and fact-finding authority; the duration and frequency of trials; and the jury’s composition and vicinage. Together, these Sections demonstrate that shifts in criminal law and
enforcement, along with (in some respects subsequent) adjudicative changes,
created the space in which enforcement-finding organically took root.

80
81
82

See infra subsection II.B.1.
See infra notes 146–85 and accompanying text.
See generally infra Section II.A.
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Transformations in Criminal Law and Enforcement

Mitigation of Punishment and the Growth of Statutes

Scholars lament the decline of the law-finding jury in America.83 But
that jury was a product of its time: an era in which criminal law was largely
judge-made and exceedingly punitive in relation to prevailing norms.84 Early
American juries’ focus on punishment was natural under the circumstances.85 Over the course of America’s first century, those circumstances
would change—and with them, the jury’s role.
Beginning with the abolition movement’s epicenter, Quaker Pennsylvania, in 1786 and soon extending to Virginia, New York, and beyond, the
new states began to reduce the number and scope of capital crimes, and to
enact criminal laws that offered more nuanced degrees of guilt and punish83 See, e.g., JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF
DEMOCRACY (1994); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131,
1190 (1991) (describing today’s jury as “a shadow of its former self”); Laura I. Appleman,
The Lost Meaning of the Jury Trial Right, 84 IND. L.J. 397 (2009).
84 Death was the sentence for many felonies, including murder, robbery, rape, burglary, even counterfeiting and horse-thievery. LOUIS P. MASUR, RITES OF EXECUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE, 1776–1865, at 71
(1989); THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 6 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 2d. ed. 1968). On the
prevalence of corporal punishment, see William E. Nelson, Emerging Notions of Modern Criminal Law in the Revolutionary Era: An Historical Perspective, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450, 461 (1967)
(describing a 1793 address by Massachusetts Governor John Hancock on the need to
reform “the infamous punishments of cropping [ears] and branding, as well as that of the
public whipping post, so frequently administered in this Government . . . . It is an indignity
to human nature, and can have but little tendency to reclaim the sufferer” (alteration in
original) (quoting Governor John Hancock, Address to a Joint Session of the Massachusetts Legislature (Jan. 31, 1793), reprinted in EDWIN POWERS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
EARLY MASSACHUSETTS 1620–1692, at 192–93 (1966))). As the quotation illustrates, these
penalties had become increasingly out of step with prevailing norms in America around
the time of the Revolution. See MASUR, supra, at 4; David Brion Davis, The Movement to
Abolish Capital Punishment in America, 1787–1861, 63 AM. HIST. REV. 23, 26 (1957) (noting
early Americans’ “considerable interest in constructing a rational and humane system of
penal law”); Robert E. Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U. PA. L.
REV. 1099, 1099 (1953) (describing a post-Revolutionary momentum in favor of limiting
capital punishment).
85 Michael Jonathan Millender, The Transformation of the American Criminal Trial,
1790–1875, at 30–32, 72 (Nov. 1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) (concluding, in painstaking study of early American trial transcripts, that the parties’
arguments were primarily addressed not to credibility determinations and truth-seeking
but rather punishment, with defense counsel “pos[ing] the judicious application of punishment as the problem at the heart of the trial”). Early American juries were widely
known to return verdicts of manslaughter even in the face of overwhelming evidence that
the defendant intended to kill, solely as a means of averting a sentence of death. See Philip
English Mackey, The Inutility of Mandatory Capital Punishment: An Historical Note, 54 B.U. L.
REV. 32, 32–35 (1974) (offering rich historical evidence of widespread juror reluctance to
convict in capital cases); see also Knowlton, supra note 84, at 1102.
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ment.86 Second-degree murder was developed around this time, largely as a
concession to capital-averse juries.87 The use of more graduated crime and
punishment soon extended beyond homicide, to crimes such as robbery,
rape, theft, and burglary.88
This capital reform movement, which had been achieved mostly by way
of statutory enactment and revision, portended a much larger shift in penal
law over the middle decades of the nineteenth century: from pre-existing,
natural law to be “found” by courts, to positive, legislatively-defined law.89
New York led the way with its draft Penal Code, and other states soon followed.90 As in other legal fields, the move towards statutory law would be
neither swift nor tidy; but by century’s end, it had wrought pervasive and
lasting changes on the jurisdictions it visited.91
In the hands of legislators, criminal law became a tool of policy. The
Industrial Revolution, European immigration, and the rise of urban populations fueled a need (both real and perceived) for greater social and eco-

86 DAVID J. BODENHAMER, FAIR TRIAL: RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED IN AMERICAN HISTORY 57
(1992); RAYMOND T. BYE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 5–6 (1919).
87 See THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 84, at 24–25; Davis, supra note 84, at
26–27.
88 See Michael H. Hoffheimer, The Rise and Fall of Lesser Included Offenses, 36 RUTGERS
L.J. 351, 381–83 (2005) (noting that lesser included offenses under the common law, and
later by statute in the form of offense degrees, proliferated beginning in the 1800s, and
illustrating the trend by way of New York’s 1829 criminal code, which provided for four
degrees of manslaughter, four degrees of arson, three degrees of burglary, four degrees of
forgery, and two degrees of robbery).
89 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at 15–16
(1977) (observing the shift in views of the criminal law from natural to positive law, and the
corresponding demand that positive law be enacted by the people, through their elected
representatives, rather than the courts); see also Sanford H. Kadish, Codifiers of the Criminal
Law: Wechsler’s Predecessors, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1098, 1131–32 (1978).
90 See CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT: A STUDY OF ANTEBELLUM LEGAL REFORM (1981); Kadish, supra note 89, at 1137. New York’s code was
enacted in 1881, sixteen years after it had first been submitted to the legislature. In that
period, other states enacted codes that drew upon New York’s draft. Id.
91 The nineteenth-century movement to codify criminal law did not yield criminal
codes in every (or even most) states. See generally COOK, supra note 90, at 209 (noting that
while the mid-nineteenth century movement for complete codification failed to take root,
partial codification was “epidemic” by the early twentieth century (quoting Lawrence M.
Friedman, Law Reform in Historical Perspective, 13 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 351, 351 (1969))). Thus,
even apart from wholesale statutory revisions of the criminal common law, the nineteenth
century saw an increasingly widespread use of statutes to define criminal conduct, particularly in the spheres of economic and social welfare. See Morissette v. United States, 342
U.S. 246, 253–54 (1952) (noting a “century-old but accelerating tendency” of legislatures
to criminalize public welfare offenses under a strict-liability regime); Darryl K. Brown,
Criminal Law’s Unfortunate Triumph over Administrative Law, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 657,
661–62 (2011) (noting widespread practice among nineteenth-century state and local governments to criminalize public order, economic, and social welfare offenses).
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nomic control,92 and legislatures increasingly turned to criminal law as a
means of achieving it. A glimpse at New York’s Penal Code, enacted in 1881
and replicated by a number of states, gives a sense of the breadth and scope
of the criminal sanction, which extended to, among other things, overloading passenger vessels, mismanagement of steamboats, trade mark infringements, public intoxication, keeping of disorderly or bawdy houses, and
running gambling establishments.93 By the early twentieth century, the criminal law had expanded its function beyond societal condemnation, to the
regulation of economic and social activity.94
These transformations served naturally to minimize the jury’s law-finding role.95 First, the advent of a more graduated and humane criminal law
gave juries more verdict options, allowing them to render a verdict according
to conscience within the dictates of law. Second, codification (or
“statutorization”) filled criminal law’s interstices. Statutes defined crimes by
specific elements, and further elucidated the meaning of terms encompassed
in those elements: “willfully,” “knowingly,” and “maliciously” were not left to
jurors’ own devising, but were defined for them.96
But where one jury role ebbed, another ascended. The growth of criminal statutes in part precipitated the rise of professionalized criminal enforcement. It also rendered enforcement discretionary. Criminal law had become
a wide-ranging, pervasive regulatory tool that could, practically speaking, be
enforced only sporadically. As will be shown, these two developments set the
stage for enforcement-finding’s rise.

92 See ERIC H. MONKKONEN, POLICE IN URBAN AMERICA, 1860–1920, at 1 (1981) (“As the
United States industrialized in the nineteenth century, Americans experienced physical
uncertainty and insecurity we would find intolerable today. Steamboats blew up. People
drowned in shallow water, unable to swim. Trains regularly mutilated and killed pedestrians. Children got run over by wagons.” (footnote omitted)).
93 See COMMISSIONERS OF THE CODE, DRAFT OF A PENAL CODE FOR NEW YORK §§ 406,
408, 410, 414, 725, 367, 368, 392 (1864) (codified as Act of July 26, 1881, ch. 676, 1881 N.Y.
Laws vol. 3, at 1).
94 Vice had long been a target of criminal law in America, particularly in Puritan New
England. See Nelson, supra note 84, at 452–53 (discussing colonial prosecutions of fornication and Sabbath-breaking). But after ebbing somewhat in the post-Revolutionary years,
see id. at 455–58, the breadth and scope of vice criminalization and prosecution increased
in the nineteenth century, a reflection of the rising temperance movement and fear—in
the North, of the rising population of European immigrants, and in the antebellum South,
of the large population of newly-freed blacks. The temperance movement was, in fact, in
large part a manifestation of those fears. See generally DANIEL OKRENT, LAST CALL: THE RISE
AND FALL OF PROHIBITION (2010) (charting Prohibition’s origins in racism, classism, and
anti-immigrant bias).
95 For a more detailed discussion of the shift away from jury law-finding, and the
attendant rise of jury fact-finding, see infra subsection II.B.1.
96 See, e.g., COMMISSIONERS OF THE CODE, DRAFT OF A PENAL CODE FOR NEW YORK
§§ 763, 766, 767 (1864) (codified as Act of July 26, 1881, ch. 676, 1881 N.Y. Laws vol. 3, at
1).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-2\NDL204.txt

716

2.

unknown

Seq: 26

notre dame law review

26-JAN-17

11:35

[vol. 92:2

The Expansion of Professionalized Criminal Enforcement

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when criminal law
was still primarily a means of sanctioning wrongs to specific victims, it was
primarily those victims (and sometimes community members) that enforced
it.97 As the criminal law extended to include more victimless conduct, private and communal enforcement no longer sufficed. At the same time, rapid
urbanization and industrialization fueled public perceptions of a need for
greater social and crime control. These developments, among others, fueled
the rise of professionalized criminal enforcement.98
With respect to policing, the transformation was sweeping. In a span of
just fifty years, most cities in America had moved from a tiny, constable-watch
system comprised of part-time volunteers to a larger, uniformed and salaried,
military-style police department, firmly under the auspices of city government.99 The experience in New York provides a useful illustration. As the
nineteenth century began, New York’s organized security force comprised a
sum total of sixteen constables, approximately forty marshals, and seventytwo night watchmen who worked on a volunteer or fee basis.100 In 1845, the
New York City Council enacted a bill providing for the creation of a professional police force modeled largely after Robert Peel’s recently formed Metropolitan Police Force in London.101 By 1869, New York’s Metropolitan
97 See Nelson, supra note 84, at 468 (explaining that offenses against property and
against morals accounted for nearly 80% of all criminal prosecutions in pre-Revolutionary
Middlesex, Massachusetts, the former of which were prosecuted by victims and the latter by
community members); Sam Bass Warner, Investigating the Law of Arrest, 31 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 111, 112 (1940) (describing use of the “hue and cry” in eighteenth- and early
nineteenth-century Britain and America, in which crime victims and their neighbors were
responsible for investigating crime and locating and arresting suspects).
98 Historians disagree about the precipitants of professionalized policing. Various theories have been offered, including rising urban crime, the increase and severity of urban
riots, a perceived breakdown in social order wrought by rising European immigration, and
structural changes that bureaucratized and “rationalized” urban governance. See generally
MONKKONEN, supra note 92, at 49–64 (reviewing historical literature and positing a
bureaucratization/rationalization theory). Professionalized policing was likely a product
of some or all of these precipitants, as well as of the transformation of the criminal law,
which was, as noted, itself partly a reaction to the perceived breakdown in social order.
The mid- to late nineteenth-century displacement of private prosecutors by a system of
nearly exclusive public prosecution was likewise precipitated by a number of factors. See
infra notes 114–20 and accompanying text.
99 MONKKONEN, supra note 92, at 40, 42 (describing the varying pace of American cities’ transition from constable-watched to professionalized, uniformed police departments);
id. at 164–68 (charting the dates of American cities’ adoption of uniformed police forces).
100 JAMES F. RICHARDSON, THE NEW YORK POLICE: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1901, at 17, 19
(1970).
101 Id. at 49. Peel, the British Home Secretary, created a police force linked to the
national government. American cities adopted a far more decentralized version, in which
police departments were linked to their municipal government. This served to localize
and politicize American policing and, in the era of urban political machines, to corrupt it.
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Police Department employed 2000 uniformed, salaried patrolmen at a total
cost of $2.8 million.102
What did these early police forces do? They patrolled.103 They made
arrests, mostly for the low-level regulatory and vice offenses for which victims
and other members of the community would not patrol.104 They functioned
in part to control the “dangerous classes”—not only criminals, but immigrants, vagrants, drunks, and the destitute.105 This control was exerted not
primarily through arrests, but more often as a form of social welfare, by offering lodging and sometimes food to the homeless.106 And most notably, they
abused power: the first professionalized police forces in America were notoriously corrupt, inept, and brutal.107
What early police forces did not much do was build prosecutable felony
cases.108 This was so for a number of reasons. First, early police departments
lacked the necessary manpower to investigate and prosecute crimes. American cities’ first modern police forces, while greater in numbers and organizational strength relative to the systems that preceded them, were still quite
small relative to the cities they policed and the crime in those cities.109 Second, they lacked the will. The mandate of early police forces was to prevent
crime (or at least regulate it) through patrol, not to investigate and prosecute

SAMUEL WALKER, A CRITICAL HISTORY OF POLICE REFORM: THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL7–8 (1977).
102 RICHARDSON, supra note 100, at 152–53.
103 WALKER, supra note 101, at 13. Or, as Walker notes, they shirked patrol duties, preferring the barbershop or saloon over walking the beat. Id.
104 Id. at 15 (estimating that roughly 60 to 80% of arrests by police officers in the later
nineteenth century “were for drunkenness and disorderly conduct”); see also LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN & ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, THE ROOTS OF JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA 1870–1910, at 75 (1981).
105 MONKKONEN, supra note 92, at 86–87.
106 Id.
107 SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 53–64
(2d ed. 1998) (describing the nineteenth century as an “era of incivility, ignorance, brutality and graft” (quoting August Vollmer & Albert Schneider, The School for Police as Planned
at Berkeley, 7 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 877 (1917))).
108 A similar claim could be made of today’s “broken windows” policing, which focuses
mostly on the prevention of crime through arrests for low-level offenses. See generally
George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/brokenwindows/304465/. But even in police departments heavily invested in broken windows
policing (New York, for instance), police still engage expansively in the investigation,
arrest, and prosecution of felony offenders. This was not the case a century ago. Anthony
A. Braga et al., Harvard Kennedy Sch. & Nat’l Inst. of Justice Exec. Session on Policing &
Pub. Safety, New Perspectives in Policing: Moving the Work of Criminal Investigators Towards
Crime Control 2 (Mar. 2011).
109 See FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 104, at 76–77; WALKER, supra note 101, at
20–21.
ISM
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past crimes.110 Third, they often lacked the impetus. The advent of modernized policing did not immediately obviate citizen arrest; to the contrary,
police arrests were mostly in the arenas not already enforced by citizens: vice
and public disorder.111 Even in those arenas, police frequently looked the
other way, a reflection of community disaffection with the laws, ward leaders’
payments, or both.112 In fact, as Eric Monkkonen has shown, the advent of
professionalized policing actually served to lower overall arrest rates, which
would not begin to climb again until the 1920s.113
The establishment of professionalized police forces did not immediately
transform criminal adjudication; that would occur later, when police forces
took on a greater investigatory and prosecutorial role. But as professionalized policing took hold, so, too, did public perceptions of it. By the nineteenth century’s close, the seeds of citizen distrust in police had been firmly
planted.
The face of prosecution likewise changed over the same time period.
Public prosecutors had existed in America since its earliest days,114 but at the
outset of the nineteenth century, they continued, in many jurisdictions, to
play largely supporting roles. It was victims or their kin that primarily
enforced the law, either through the aid of private counsel or on their
own.115 The rise of public prosecutors and displacement of private prosecutors was in many ways a function of the same forces behind codification and
professionalized policing: the remaking of criminal law as a tool of regulation
110 FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 104, at 80; MONKKONEN, supra note 92, at 31
(describing the focus of early police departments as “the orderly functioning of cities, a
small part of which was catching criminals”); WALKER, supra note 101, at 19.
111 See supra note 104 and accompanying text; see also ROGER LANE, POLICING THE CITY:
BOSTON 1822–1885, at 129–30 (1967) (“Responsibility for enforcement in any case
belonged with the courts and individual complainants.”). Alderman Thomas Amory
quipped in 1863 that “[i]t is the duty of the police officer to serve . . . warrants, when
directed to him. It is nowhere made his duty to initiate prosecutions.” Id.; see also FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 104, at 81, 86 (calculating that only 6% of police arrests in
Oakland, California, between 1872 and 1910 were for felony crimes, and noting that
crimes involving victims were only handled by police if a victim complained).
112 FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 104, at 94. In Massachusetts, whose puritanical
roots inspired a far more robust temperance movement than elsewhere, the problems of
non-enforcement of liquor laws in Boston led the governor to create a state constabulary—
effectively, the nation’s first state police force—to enforce the state’s prohibition law.
LANE, supra note 111, at 136–37. Some of the state constable’s cases were brought before
juries, who were notoriously unreceptive to prohibition. Id. at 138.
113 MONKKONEN, supra note 92, at 65–85.
114 Abraham S. Goldstein, History of the Public Prosecutor, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME
AND JUSTICE 1286, 1286–88 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983).
115 See BODENHAMER, supra note 86, at 63; MIKE MCCONVILLE & CHESTER L. MIRSKY, JURY
TRIALS AND PLEA BARGAINING: A TRUE HISTORY 28 (2005) (“[T]he mainspring of the criminal justice system in the first half of nineteenth century New York was the private prosecutor. It was the private prosecutor—the victim or someone acting on his or her behalf—
who initiated the overwhelming majority of complaints and in whose name complaints
were launched.”); ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA, 1800–1880, at 114 (1989).
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and social control, and public dissatisfaction with existing mechanisms of
criminal enforcement.116 As Allen Steinberg has richly documented, the
movement from private to public prosecution that swept Philadelphia in the
middle decades of the nineteenth century was one aspect of a larger transformation that moved criminal enforcement out of the hands of “ordinary citizens and neighborhood politicians” and under the control of salaried
municipal officials.117
By the latter half of the nineteenth century, prosecution had moved to a
mostly (and in a number of places, entirely) public model.118 No longer was
prosecution the prerogative of complainants; it was now firmly in the hands
of less partial state actors tasked with administering “justice.” The shift
portended a larger transformation in criminal adjudication: from an adversarial contest between interested parties to a quasi-administrative inquest.
Power and discretion were reallocated. Public prosecutors displaced magistrates and grand juries as the system’s gatekeepers. Soon, through the rise of
plea bargaining, they also displaced petit juries as the system’s primary adjudicators.119 By the nineteenth century’s close, public prosecutors decided
who would be charged; the crimes with which they would be charged; and, in
all but a small number of those cases, the negotiated outcome.
The rise of public prosecution (and the attendant rise of plea bargaining120) had lasting and significant effects on the criminal jury’s role. First, it
shifted the focus of the jury’s discretionary authority. In hearing every case
for which a grand jury or magistrate had found probable case (a rather low
standard), criminal juries had to evaluate both reasonable doubt and the
appropriateness of the criminal sanction. Now, criminal juries heard only
cases the prosecutor saw fit to bring—effectively putting at issue the prosecutor’s determination of those factors. Second, it changed the jury’s core function. Where once juries decided the outcome of most criminal disputes, now
they served primarily as outside checks—auditors, effectively—in an administrative scheme.121 Most importantly, public prosecution enlarged the parameters of that audit. More and more, juries assessed not only the actions of the
accused, but also those of the accusers.
116 Goldstein, supra note 114, at 1287–88.
117 STEINBERG, supra note 115, at 224.
118 BODENHAMER, supra note 86, at 68; see also Goldstein, supra note 114, at 1288.
119 See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 211, 223
(1979).
120 The cause of plea bargaining’s rise is the subject of a rich and ongoing debate. See
MCCONVILLE & MIRSKY, supra note 115, at 1–9 (summarizing the literature). In tying plea
bargaining to the rise of public prosecutors, I do not advance so simplistic a claim as that
the latter caused the former. Rather, my point is that each of these moves—from private
to public prosecution, trials to plea bargaining, adjudication to administration—were
interrelated, as well as related to the social, economic, and political shifts then underway.
For a wonderfully complex synthesis of these varying causes and their interrelationships,
see generally id.
121 See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
2117, 2149 (1998).
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Police Investigation and the Adoption and Contraction of the
Exclusionary Rule

By the early twentieth century, the police had become central to the
prosecution of felony crimes. Municipal police forces expanded, both in size
and scope, and new law enforcement agencies (federal and state) were
born.122 As police forces grew, so did citizens’ expectations of them. Technology contributed heavily to this shift: the two-way radio and, later, telephone allowed immediate reporting of crime, and the automobile enabled
timely response to it.123 Reliance on foot patrol receded, and, with it, the
focus on public order.124 Attention turned to detecting crime and apprehending suspects.125
The shift redefined the relationship between citizens and police. Police
now functioned as interrogators, searchers, invaders of homes and persons.
In a system devoid of regulation, abuses were common; this was the era of the
“third degree.”126 Police forces also increasingly bore arms, a development
that further aggrandized police power relative to citizens.127
By the second and third decades of the twentieth century, public attention fixated on the problems of policing. Police commissions sprung up
across the nation, each varying in approach and format but all directed to a
singular end: systemic police reform.128 The potential effect of police misconduct on criminal juries began to be noticed, as an article in the 1937
volume of the Harvard Law Review illustrates:
[Anyone] who wishes to know why we have no better success with the prevention of crime in the United States may stop with these two facts.
On the one side he will see the stupid habit of police terrorism, which,
failing utterly to dissuade the criminal[s], simply tends to discredit really
good detective work whenever it is performed. On the other side he will see
police officers apparently perjuring themselves in one another’s support and
thus destroying the confidence of the public and of juries in police testimony everywhere else. Behind the stenographic record of that evidence
every intelligent man can read a long tale of acquittals, hung juries, cases
nolle prossed because of the impossibility of conviction; and behind that tale
again he can read a longer list of criminals left to roam and to multiply their
kind because the good work that American police are capable of is so often
122 See MONKKONEN, supra note 92, at 144; WALKER, supra note 101, at 144–45.
123 See WALKER, supra note 101, at 137.
124 See MONKKONEN, supra note 92, at 145, 147; WALKER, supra note 101, at 136.
125 See MONKKONEN, supra note 92, at 147; WALKER, supra note 101, at 135.
126 See Zechariah Chafee, Jr. et al., The Third Degree: Report to the National Commission on
Law Observance and Enforcement, in NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT,
REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 13, 13–261 (1931).
127 See WALKER, supra note 107, at 63.
128 See Walker, supra note 101, at 130–31. The most famous of these was the Wickersham Commission, created by President Hoover in 1929 to review the entire criminal justice system. Of the fourteen reports it produced, it was the Commission’s indictment of
police forces that drew the most attention. Id. at 132.
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hindered or destroyed by the suspicions that flow from police stupidity and
brutality.129

When commission-led reform efforts failed to bear fruit, lawmakers and
courts soon got into the mix. In 1914 the Supreme Court adopted the federal exclusionary rule.130 By mid-century, more than half the states in the
nation had enacted exclusionary rules of their own.131 By the time Earl Warren began, in 1961, to rewrite the rules of policing—starting with Mapp v.
Ohio—public sentiment firmly favored more regulation of police.132 As
Corinna Lain has shown, the Warren Court’s aggressive regulation of policing was less a “revolution” than an adaption of doctrine to prevailing
majoritarian views—at least outside the South.133
These doctrinal developments occupied a special place in the public
consciousness. The Warren Court’s criminal procedure cases generated
intense public interest; the cases were publicized, debated, and commented
upon widely in the media and the political sphere.134 Americans quickly
became familiar with the rights afforded suspects in interactions with law
enforcement. The right to remain silent; to a lawyer upon police questioning; to be free in most circumstances from warrantless searches and seizures;
to be free from arrest absent probable cause—these became, to borrow Carol
Steiker’s term, “constitutional norms”: rules the public expected the police to
follow.135
Some of those rules worked their way into jury trials. More and more,
juries were asked to find facts implicating them: whether the police coerced a
defendant’s statements, for instance, or suggested an eyewitness’s identification. In the main, though, the new procedural rules did not substantially
129 Sam B. Warner & Henry B. Cabot, Changes in the Administration of Criminal Justice
During the Past Fifty Years, 50 HARV. L. REV. 583, 594 (1937) (quoting Editorial, N.Y. HERALD
TRIB., July 20, 1932, at 14).
130 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
131 Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court’s
Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1381 (2004) (“By the time
the Court decided Mapp [v. Ohio in 1961], a solid half of the states had already adopted
the exclusionary rule, with the trend among them unmistakably in favor of the Court’s
decision. Indeed, no state to consider the exclusionary rule after 1949 rejected it . . . while
most of those adopting it used majoritarian politics to effectuate the change.” (footnotes
omitted)).
132 See id. at 1382.
133 Id. at 1368–69 (“Mapp [v. Ohio] reflected an emerging national consensus about the
exclusionary rule . . . Miranda [v. Arizona] . . . too was a product of its time and well within
the parameters of publicly acceptable responses to the problem of coercive
interrogation.”).
134 See id. at 1383 n.121 (describing national press coverage of Mapp); id. at 1390
(describing the “canoniz[ation] by popular culture” of the right to counsel afforded indigent defendants in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)); id. at 1404–07, 1416–17
(describing national press coverage on the issue of coercive police interrogation and the
Supreme Court’s response to it, and observing that the Miranda warnings became “so
famous, anyone who watches television can recite them”).
135 See generally Steiker, supra note 75.
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impact jury trials. Nor was that their intended effect; to the contrary, the
exclusionary rule was designed to prevent juries from hearing evidence
tainted by police misconduct.136
This soon changed, as any student of criminal procedure knows well. Of
principal importance to the criminal jury, though, is the way it changed. As
Steiker has so incisively demonstrated, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts’
contraction of the exclusionary rule was one-dimensional: by constructing
doctrinal escape hatches from exclusion—for instance, standing, good faith,
and inevitable discovery137—it curtailed the remedy for constitutional violations while leaving the boundaries of constitutional conduct firmly intact.
This method, Steiker has posited, gave rise to “acoustic separation,” a phenomenon in which rules governing conduct and rules governing the sanction
for that conduct diverge to such an extent that the audience for each set of
rules functions in an essentially separate legal regime, akin to a sound-proof
chamber.138 That is, the public hears the boundary of proper police conduct, while the police hear what happens if they step outside the line. When
the two sets of rules are discordant—when police misconduct has no legal
sanction—the police and public operate under entirely different conceptions
of what “the law” of policing requires.
Steiker’s insights carry a number of implications, foremost of which, for
Steiker, are those for police behavior and public misperceptions of it.139 Yet
there has been another important—and unnoted—consequence of “acoustic
separation” in constitutional criminal procedure: its effect on jury trials. By
retaining constitutional norms while limiting the exclusionary sanction, the
Court has increasingly made way for admission of evidence that jurors believe
(or at the least suspect) has been improperly obtained. The effect is exacerbated by savvy defense attorneys, who draw the jury’s attention to police
investigatory tactics, as well as by the police themselves, who, as Steiker points
out, are incentivized to conduct themselves in accordance with the rules of
constitutional sanction rather than the rules of constitutional conduct.
Criminal trials in the late twentieth century, in other words, became portals between the two acoustically separated chambers. Of course, the effect
136 See generally Lawrence Crocker, Can the Exclusionary Rule be Saved?, 84 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 310, 313–16 (1993) (discussing background on the purpose and development of the exclusionary rule).
137 Other such exclusionary escape valves include the “sufficiently attenuated” exception to the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine; harmless error; the use of unconstitutionally-obtained evidence for impeachment; and limitations on federal habeas review of state
criminal convictions. Steiker, supra note 75, at 2469.
138 Id. at 2469–70. Steiker borrows the term from Meir Dan-Cohen, who in turn drew
from Jeremy Bentham. See id. at 2469 (citing Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct
Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 626 (1984)). DanCohen used the construct to describe divergence between “conduct rules” and “decision
rules” in substantive criminal law. Dan-Cohen, supra, at 626.
139 Police, Steiker argues, are likely to ignore conduct rules and act in accordance with
the far more permissive decision rules, while the public assumes (incorrectly) that the
police are behaving lawfully. See Steiker, supra note 75, at 2469.
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of this development is impossible to measure empirically; we have no reliable
data as to the frequency of either constitutional violations by police or courts’
application of the exclusionary rule.140 But just as we can observe the rule’s
influence on police,141 so, too, can we feel its effects on criminal trials.142
The Warren Court recalibrated the public’s (and thus the jury’s) expectations of policing—expectations not dampened by subsequent remedial limitations. As with the developments that had come before—punishment’s
mitigation, criminal law’s “statutorization” and broadening scope, the rise of
professional police and prosecutors—this development marked the latest
chapter in a recurring story.
***
It is a story of responsive change. When prescribed penalties diverged
from community norms, juries aligned them. When criminal laws became
tools of state regulation, and arrest and prosecution the discretionary use of
those tools, the jury naturally focused on the exercise of that discretion. And
as external regulation of law enforcement actors grew and then ebbed, the
jury bridged that chasm.
But the story is not merely about response to external change. It is also
about internal change, to criminal adjudication and to juries themselves.
The next Section discusses these internal changes, their relationship to external forces, and their impact on the jury’s role.
B.

Transformations in Criminal Adjudication

Criminal adjudication in the United States has undergone many shifts,
but three in particular influenced enforcement-finding. These include shifts
in the allocation of the law- and fact-finding functions; the duration and frequency of trials; and the jury’s composition and vicinage. This Section charts
these changes and their relationship with the external transformations discussed in Section A.
1.

The Decline of Law-Finding and Rise of Fact-Finding

The decline of the criminal jury’s “law-finding” function is well-documented.143 There has been less scholarly focus on its causes, and less still on
140 Scholars attempting to study the effect of the rule on police behavior have pointed
to the absence of such data. See generally Albert W. Alschuler, Studying the Exclusionary Rule:
An Empirical Classic, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1365 (2008) (discussing data limitations and scholars’ attempts to empirically test the rule’s effect on police).
141 See id. at 1372 (noting the rule’s observable, though unmeasurable, effects on
policing).
142 See generally supra Section I.A (discussing observable evidence of jury evaluation of
law enforcement).
143 The Supreme Court formally declared an end to the jury’s authority to decide the
law in Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102 (1895). The literature on Sparf, and the
history of jury nullification more broadly, is voluminous. For some examples, see generally
Abramson, supra note 83; David C. Brody, Sparf and Dougherty Revisited: Why the Court
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the simultaneous (and, I argue, concomitant) rise of jury fact-finding. Yet
together, as I show, these changes both reflected the need for enforcementfinding and enabled its growth.
At the outset, it is worth highlighting that the jury’s historical right to
make law is perhaps more equivocal than the standard accounts would have
it. Some historical accounts show that both the practice and right of juries to
declare law varied across the colonies and early states, as well as between civil
and criminal trials.144 Nevertheless, it is fair to say that criminal juries in a
number of colonies and early states possessed far more authority to find law
than exists today. The criminal jury’s authority to make law declined over
the course of the nineteenth century as courts (both state and federal) gradually limited the jury’s role, a process that culminated in the Supreme
Court’s 1895 decision in Sparf.145
Far less attention has been paid to the criminal jury’s fact-finding
role.146 Yet its transformation has changed the criminal trial as much as—if
not more than—jury law-finding’s decline. For the eighteenth and much of
the nineteenth century, the criminal jury’s part in ascertaining historical fact
was a nominal one, at least relative to today. It was trial judges who played
the starring role. Judges advised the jury as to the credibility of witnesses, the
weight of the evidence, and the persuasiveness of argument—advice juries
were believed to routinely follow.147 At the close of trial, judges summarized
Should Instruct the Jury of Its Nullification Right, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 89 (1995); Harrington,
supra note 3.
144 See Stanton D. Krauss, An Inquiry into the Right of Criminal Juries to Determine the Law in
Colonial America, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 111, 122 (1998) (finding the historical
record inadequate to determine the extent of colonial criminal juries’ law-finding authority, but arguing that some data calls the standard account into question, particularly in
Massachusetts, Georgia, and Maryland); William E. Nelson, The Lawfinding Power of Colonial
American Juries, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1003, 1004 (2010) (finding that the colonies of New
England and the colony of Virginia permitted civil and criminal juries to make law, while
the colonies of New York, Pennsylvania, and North and South Carolina did not).
145 See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 3, at 910.
146 The few exceptions include Fisher, supra note 2, at 624–56 (focusing particularly on
the jury’s changing role in determining the credibility of witnesses), and Kenneth A. Krasity, The Role of the Judge in Jury Trials: The Elimination of Judicial Evaluation of Fact in American
State Courts from 1795 to 1913, 62 U. DET. L. REV. 595, 595 (1985) (focusing on the demise
of trial judges’ commentary on the evidence). Others have incidentally documented the
fact-finding process in nineteenth-century criminal trials as part of studies on other subjects. See, e.g., MCCONVILLE & MIRSKY, supra note 115, at 149–52 (documenting mid-nineteenth-century criminal trials in New York City as part of a study of plea bargaining’s rise);
see also FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 104 (same in Alameda County, California); Millender, supra note 85, at 4–5.
147 See MCCONVILLE & MIRSKY, supra note 115, at 141; Krasity, supra note 146, at 618
(discussing widespread belief among nineteenth-century American jurists and legislators
that judicial evaluation of evidence heavily influenced the jury); cf. John H. Langbein, The
Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 285 (1978) (discussing how juries in
seventeenth-century London “routinely follow[ed] the judge’s lead” in evaluating the evidence, so much so “that it is difficult to characterize the jury as [having] function[ed]
autonomously”).
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and imparted their opinion on the evidence and the believability of witnesses.148 When juries hung, judges directed a verdict.149 Sometimes,
before giving the case to the jury, judges simply instructed the jury as to the
verdict that should be rendered.150
Limitations on the jury’s fact-finding power were not merely a function
of the judicial role. Evidentiary doctrines also played a part. The testimonial
right for defendants,151 limitations on the use of circumstantial evidence,152
mandatory rules for evaluating witness testimony,153 and the standard of
proof (requiring proof to a moral certainty rather than beyond a reasonable
doubt)154 all impoverished the jury’s contribution to the fact-finding task.
So, too, did practical constraints. In the days of pre-automotive transport, for
instance, the challenges of witness travel led to frequent reliance on stipulations in lieu of live testimony.155
Yet over the course of the nineteenth century, as the criminal jury’s lawfinding role slowly declined, its fact-finding role grew. States began to prohibit judicial evaluation of evidence, finding it an infringement on the jury’s
role.156 The evolution of evidentiary doctrine fortified the jury’s fact-finding
148 MCCONVILLE & MIRSKY, supra note 115, at 141; Krasity, supra note 146; see also Millender, supra note 85, at 239, 282–88.
149 MCCONVILLE & MIRSKY, supra note 115, at 141–52; Millender, supra note 85, at 235.
150 MCCONVILLE & MIRSKY, supra note 115, at 141–52 (describing the common judicial
practice, in New York trial courts, of advising the jury of the appropriate outcome). So
ingrained was the practice that as late as 1930 the United States Supreme Court listed it as
one of the three “essential elements” of criminal trials inherited from the common law,
along with a jury of twelve and unanimity:
[A] trial by jury as understood and applied at common law . . . includes all the
essential elements as they were recognized in this country and England when the
Constitution was adopted . . . [among them] that the trial should be in the presence and under the superintendence of a judge having power to instruct them as
to the law and advise them in respect of the facts . . . .
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930) (emphasis added).
151 Fisher, supra note 2, at 662–68 (documenting the gradual movement across states in
the second half of the nineteenth century to give defendants a testimonial right).
152 See Millender, supra note 85, at 82.
153 These included, for instance, the rule requiring jurors to reject in its entirety the
testimony of a witness found to have lied about a single point. See Fisher, supra note 2, at
655–56 (noting this rule remained in practice in the parts of the United States for much of
the nineteenth century, and in some jurisdictions even into the twentieth century).
154 See Steve Sheppard, The Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the Burden
of Proof Have Weakened the Presumption of Innocence, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1165, 1180–95
(2003) (describing the evolution from the moral certainty standard to the reasonable
doubt standard over the course of the late eighteenth to mid-nineteenth centuries).
155 See Millender, supra note 85, at 261.
156 Krasity, supra note 146, at 597, 622 app. A. While a small number of states and the
federal system have not formally amended the traditional common-law rule permitting
judicial commentary on the evidence, in practice such commentary is exceedingly rare,
and risks reversal. See Fisher, supra note 2, at 577 n.2; see also United States v. Mundy, 539
F.3d 154, 158–59 (2d Cir. 2008) (“For good reason, th[e] practice [of judges’ summarizing
the evidence] has fallen into widespread disfavor, absent special circumstances. Judges
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role: interested witnesses were permitted to testify, as were criminal defendants;157 circumstantial evidence gained acceptance;158 witness credibility
became the jury’s exclusive province.159 And reasonable doubt served to
focus jurors’ inquiries more acutely on the evidence presented and less on
jurors’ personal moral beliefs.160
An 1869 decision of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in a simple
theft case captures the massive changes then underway in the roles of jury
and judge in criminal trials, and highlights the interconnectedness of lawfinding’s decline with fact-finding’s rise:
[Historically, t]he line between law and fact was not drawn as it is now being
drawn in this State. The attention of the bar, court, and jury was seldom
called to the distinction. . . .
....
. . . We are now contending with those difficulties. The law is burdened and
obscured by a great mass of common opinion, general understanding, practice, precedent, and authority . . . that has passed for law, but is in truth not
law, but fact, coming down to us largely by descent from the ancient custom
of the judge giving the jury his opinion of the evidence. To clear the law of
this encumbrance, revive elementary principles strictly legal in their nature,
separate the province of the court from the province of the jury, and maintain the latter in its entirety, is a duty put upon us . . . [following the New
Hampshire Supreme Court’s 1843 decision holding that] the jury are not
the judges of the law in criminal cases.161

Why did the jury’s law-finding authority decline, and its fact-finding
power grow? Few have considered these questions in tandem.162 The
decline of jury law-finding has been attributed to, variously, a judicial powercannot marshal the evidence without exercising their own judgment on how evidence
should be described, which aspects should be stressed, which aspects ignored. In doing so,
courts inescapably influence the jury on decisions which should be in the jury’s sole province. . . . Today, marshaling of evidence is rarely practiced in federal court.” (footnote
omitted) (first citing United States v. Kahaner, 317 F.2d 459, 479–80 & n.12 (2d Cir. 1963);
and then citing 21A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE §§ 5081, 5082.4 (2d ed. 2016))).
157 Fisher, supra note 2, at 662–68.
158 Millender, supra note 85, at 82–92 (charting the gradual acceptance by eighteenthand early nineteenth-century trial courts of circumstantial evidence).
159 See Fisher, supra note 2, at 581.
160 See Sheppard, supra note 154, at 1201 (“What distinguished reasonable doubt from
all other doubts was precisely that a reasonable person would form the doubt based not on
general preoccupations relating to human affairs but upon a consideration limited to the
evidence presented in the case at hand.”).
161 State v. Hodge, 50 N.H. 510, 520, 522 (N.H. 1869).
162 Cf. Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170
(1964) (examining the effort, in Massachusetts, to separate the roles of judge and jury
through the law/fact distinction, but finding the effort to have been a failure, with judges
reclaiming the fact-finding mantle by the nineteenth century’s close).
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grab;163 an aspect of the larger transition to positive law in the American
legal system;164 and part of the Reconstruction effort to stamp out lawlessness in southern state courts.165 The rise of jury fact-finding has been
scarcely studied at all. George Fisher’s study of the jury’s role in assessing
witness credibility comes closest. He ascribes that particular change to the
demise of public faith in the truthfulness of sworn testimony, and the resultant turn to juries as an alternative source of public confidence in trial
outcomes.166
All of these explanations are valid, but none accounts for attendant
transformations in criminal law and its enforcement, or the connection
between the law-finding and fact-finding shifts. Taking these into account
offers a different perspective.167 As criminal law became a means of pervasive, legislatively imposed regulation, and as its enforcement moved from the
hands of private litigants to public actors, the potential for state abuses rose.
But unlike the perceived abuses of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, which concerned laws themselves—that is, prescribed penalties discordant with popular views—these abuses concerned the enforcement of laws.168
To reign in enforcement abuses, juries needed unfettered authority to evaluate the evidence presented by the enforcers. Judges, who might have been
predisposed to the public prosecutors they saw each day, and who were accustomed to the nature of proof in criminal cases, were comparatively poor arbiters when it came to evaluating law enforcement.169
In this respect, the criminal jury’s movement from law-finding to factfinding aligned with shifts in criminal enforcement then underway. As with
those shifts, it fueled enforcement-finding’s rise. It also reflected a perceived
need. Criminal law and enforcement were undergoing massive change; criminal adjudication needed to adapt.
163 Harrington, supra note 3, at 379–80. For the classic argument, see Howe, supra note
3.
164 See ABRAMSON, supra note 83; FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE
INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 41 (1985); Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 3, at
915. Rachel Barkow has located more acutely the shift in positive law’s precipitation of the
administrative state. See Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the
Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1340–45 (2008).
165 See generally Jonathan Bressler, Reconstruction and the Transformation of Jury Nullification, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1133 (2011).
166 Fisher, supra note 2, at 704–07.
167 This perspective is admittedly criminal-centric; but then, so was the move from lawfinding to fact-finding, which came first to criminal cases.
168 On the distinction, from a state-abuse perspective, between statutory breadth and
discretionary enforcement of broad statutes, see Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth,
83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491 (2008).
169 Cf. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (“The purpose of a jury is to guard
against the exercise of arbitrary power—to make available the commonsense judgment of
the community as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the professional or perhaps over-conditioned or biased response of a judge.” (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155–56 (1968))).
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Trial Process

Over the latter decades of the nineteenth century, criminal trial
processes underwent sweeping transformation. This shift did not fuel
enforcement-finding so much as it exacerbated its effects, particularly on
untried cases.
In early America, criminal jury trials were, for the most part, commonplace and rote affairs.170 An impaneled jury would typically sit for the day
and hear not just one, but a number of trials.171 In the absence of counsel—
as was not uncommon, both for defendants and prosecuting victims—the
parties themselves called witnesses (who spoke on their own, without
prompts and questions), and put on other evidence.172 Juries usually deliberated quickly, if at all; often, they issued a verdict without ever leaving the
jury box.173
This mode of adjudication was well-suited to the law-finding criminal
jury. Jury trials created a “common law” of jury verdicts. And because jury
trials predominated, the common law of jury verdicts became, effectively, the
criminal law on the ground. Comparatively, early American jury trials were
decidedly not well suited to jury fact-finding. Hurried presentations of evidence made for poor examination and analysis. The dearth of counsel
impoverished the adversarial questioning so critical to jury fact-finding. It
also necessarily aggrandized the judge’s role and, accordingly, tacitly
encouraged jury deference to judicial opinion on the facts.
In the mid-nineteenth century, as criminal law and enforcement transformed, so, too, did jury trials. First, there were fewer of them. By the last
decades of the nineteenth century, in most jurisdictions cases disposed of by
plea bargain well surpassed those disposed of by trial.174 Second, trials
became longer and more complicated. Defense counsel became more com170 For a broad, descriptive account of criminal trials in Britain around the same time—
which, by some accounts, were similar in processes and procedures to those in the new
American states—see Langbein, supra note 147.
171 FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 104, at 194; Malcolm M. Feeley, Plea Bargaining
and the Structure of the Criminal Process, 7 JUST. SYS. J. 338, 345–46 (1982) (noting that trials
in nineteenth-century New Haven involved “the same judge and jury . . . handl[ing] several
cases in a one or two-day period; trial, deliberation and sentencing could all occur within
the span of an hour or two”).
172 FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 104, at 194; LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 237–38 (1993) (“Most . . . ‘trials’ were short; most of the
defendants had no lawyer . . . and there was not much quibbling about niceties of
evidence.”).
173 MCCONVILLE & MIRSKY, supra note 115, at 149 (stating that a study of trials in New
York City courts from 1800 to 1845 found that the jury rendered verdict without retiring to
deliberate in 64% of recorded cases).
174 See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1979)
(“[P]lea bargaining became a dominant method of resolving criminal cases at the end of
the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth . . . .”).
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mon, along with new procedural protections for criminal defendants.175 A
more robust adversarial system encouraged more vigorous presentation of
evidence, along with more exacting jury analysis of it.
These changes significantly affected the jury’s role. With the majority of
cases now adjudicated by plea, the common law of jury verdicts no longer
served as the criminal law on the ground. Instead, it became a facet of the
“law” of plea bargaining. Along with other considerations, and more than
any of them, the parties’ assessment of the likely trial outcome set the terms
of the negotiated plea.176 In this way, individual jury verdicts gained outsized
power.
The nature of jury verdict “law” changed, too: it became a common law
of proof. This was a product both of plea bargaining, which tended to steer
incontrovertible cases to pre-trial disposition, and the prohibition on jury
law-finding, which focused trials more intensely on the strength and nature
of the proof. By at least the third or fourth decade of the twentieth century,
proof was found, compiled, and presented almost entirely by public police
and prosecutors. Assessing it, then, meant assessing them.
3.

Jury Composition and Vicinage

Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century and accelerating in the twentieth century, jury venires became increasingly representative of the communities most affected by crime—a result of states’ amendments to vicinage
requirements, the geographic narrowing of jury districts, and the reduction
of juror eligibility requirements. These developments fueled enforcementfinding’s rise.
Start with vicinage. For the colonies and early states, jury vicinage
requirements were designed to protect criminal defendants from judgment
by a foreign sovereign—England, and, following the Revolution, another
state.177 Thus, in the colonies and early states, criminal juries were not necessarily drawn from the local community in which the crime took place, or
even in the defendant’s residence. Practices varied widely, a factor that contributed to the federal Bill of Rights drafters’ decision to adopt a specific
geographic demarcation (district or state) in lieu of the highly variant con175 See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 911, 920 & n.25 (2006).
176 See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2464, 2498–2504 (2004); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract,
101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1925–26 (1992).
177 See William Wirt Blume, The Place of Trial of Criminal Cases: Constitutional Vicinage and
Venue, 43 MICH. L. REV. 59, 67 (1944) (“[T]he indefinite vicinage provisions found in some
of the early [state] constitutions were intended to guard against transportation out of the
state or to some distant place for trial.”); see also Nelson, supra note 144, at 1007 (defining
the importance of “local” by reference to the people of the colony, as opposed to Parliament in England).
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cept of “vicinage.”178 While a number of state constitutions in early America
guaranteed criminal defendants the right to a jury of the “vicinage,” few
interpreted that term as something other than the state.179
Over time, as the states grew in population and the nation expanded
westward, vicinage became a local concept. Increasingly, states joining the
Union adopted constitutional provisions requiring that juries be selected
from the county of the alleged crime.180 In other states, legislatures
amended constitutions to align “vicinage” with “county” or a similar narrowlydrawn geographic boundary.181 In still others, legislatures enacted statutes
specifying the counties in which a defendant could be tried (typically, the
county in which the crime occurred, the victim was harmed, the defendant
resided, or some combination of these).182
Meanwhile, as jurors increasingly were drawn from their local county,
counties became more local. As the population in and around cities
exploded, counties subdivided, covering an increasingly smaller territory.183
As a result of both these forces, and contrary to impression,184 jury
venires became more local, not less. They also became more diverse. The
“blue ribbon” jury of property-owning, educated white men of the early
Republic gave way, over the course of the nineteenth century, to a more
178 See Drew L. Kershen, Vicinage, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 801, 822–23 (1976) (describing how
James Madison noted the difficulty of obtaining lawmakers’ agreement on the meaning of
“vicinage,” because “[t]he truth is that in most of the States the practice is different . . . . In
some States, jurors are drawn from the whole body of the community indiscriminately; in
others, from large districts comprehending a number of Counties; and in a few only from a
single County” (quoting V.G. HUNT, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 1787–1790, at 424
(1904))).
179 Blume, supra note 177, at 67 (noting that in the states that adopted their constitutions “prior to 1800, a jury of the county or other small vicinage was not generally thought
to be of sufficient importance to have constitutional protection,” and “the indefinite vicinage provisions found in some of the early constitutions were intended to guard against
transportation out of the state or to some distant place for trial”).
180 See id. at 77.
181 Id. at 78–79.
182 See generally id. (describing various state venue statutes and challenges to them in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries). These statutes were directed technically to
venue, but necessarily influenced the geographic locus from which the jury was selected.
While defendants challenged these statutes as violating the common-law “right” to be tried
in the country in which the crime occurred, as Blume demonstrates, neither venue nor
vicinage was ever so narrowly construed in the colonies or early states. Id. at 89.
183 See Atlas of Historical County Boundaries, THE NEWBERRY LIBRARY, http://publications
.newberry.org/ahcbp/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2016). The comprehensive interactive online
database allows users to, among other things, see visuals of county boundaries in each
state, as compared to present-day boundaries. It also provides a useful nation-wide animation of county subdivision over time. See id.
184 See William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1995–96 (2008) (positing that jury pools have become progressively less localized since the Gilded Age, but
acknowledging an absence of data supporting the claim).
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diversified mix of jurors.185 Race, gender, education, and socio-economic
status were just some of the categories in which venires (and, indirectly,
juries) diversified. This was not true everywhere—particularly in the South
for much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, where systematic exclusion of blacks from both venires and petit juries ultimately required federal
legislative and judicial intervention.186 But by the latter half of the twentieth
century, and particularly in jurisdictions drawn along city lines—for instance,
Boston, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., New Orleans, San Francisco, and the five boroughs of New York, to name just a few of the biggest
such urban jurisdictions187—jury venires looked more like the city’s list of
registered voters, if not its residents.188
These shifts fueled enforcement-finding. As criminal enforcement
professionalized, localities were (and remained) its predominant administrators. And as juries increasingly assessed the work of those front-line administrators—police and prosecutors—jury demographics took on new
significance. In the main, prosecutorial elections had done little to engender
real prosecutorial accountability, a dynamic that persists today.189 And
police departments, notwithstanding their accountability to elected officials,
remained for the most part impervious to public assessment. But as juries
began, in many of the nation’s largest cities, to reflect the local electorate—
and even, at times, the communities most affected by crime and policing190—police and prosecutors faced an accounting in the courtroom unlike
that at the ballot box or in city hall.
185 See generally Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 3, at 877 (chronicling the changes in jury
eligibility from the time of the Founding, when “[e]very state limited jury service to men;
every state except Vermont restricted jury service to property owners or taxpayers; three
states permitted only whites to serve; and one state, Maryland, disqualified atheists,”
through the relaxation of those requirements over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries).
186 Id. at 882–97.
187 See List of Consolidated City-Counties, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, http://www.nlc.org/
build-skills-and-networks/resources/cities-101/city-structures/list-of-consolidated-citycounty-governments (last visited Oct. 20, 2016) (listing forty such jurisdictions).
188 The criticism of voter lists as under-representative of minorities, see, e.g., Nancy J.
King, Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure? A Contemporary Review of Affirmative Action in Jury
Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 707, 712–13 (1993), is well-founded. Yet it was only fairly
recently that jury eligibility even accorded with voting rights. See Alschuler & Deiss, supra
note 3, at 878–79. Thus, while the movement to expand juror eligibility still falls short of
achieving adequate minority representation, what it at least did achieve was an alignment
between the voting public and the jury venire. This served to make criminal prosecutions
democratically accountable in a way they had not been previously.
189 See generally Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
581 (2009).
190 See Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099, 1112–13
(2005) (discussing salutary democratic benefits of minorities’ over-representation on
juries, and positing that, in a jurisdiction that is 35% African-American, random selection
will yield a third of juries with five to six African Americans, and 8% with seven to eight
African Americans); see also DANIEL GIVELBER & AMY FARRELL, NOT GUILTY 124 (2012) (ana-
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The dynamic was not entirely fortuitous. In the mid-twentieth century in
particular, it profited from a broader judicial push to regulate law enforcement and make it more democratically accountable. The decisions that constitutionalized and imposed on the states a right to a jury trial in felony
cases,191 a right to a jury selected “from a fair cross section of the community,”192 and a right to be free from race-based peremptory challenges193
were, like other decisions in the constitutional criminal procedure “revolution,” inspired by, and directed at, two principal (and related) problems: law
enforcement abuses and institutionalized racism. Duncan v. Louisiana
extended the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial right to the states in a case involving an egregious abuse of police and prosecutorial discretion.194 Taylor v.
Louisiana spoke directly to the links between juror eligibility, political
accountability, and the criminal justice system’s legitimacy.195 And Batson v.
Kentucky196 held that race-based peremptory strikes violate “the protection
that a trial by jury is intended to secure,” protection guaranteed through “‘a
body . . . composed of the peers or equals of the person whose rights it is
lyzing racial diversity of juries in a random sampling of criminal cases from four jurisdictions—Los Angeles, California, Maricopa, Arizona, Bronx, New York, and Washington,
D.C.—and noting that “there were more juries (thirty-four) with no White members than
there were juries that had no Black members,” and furthermore that a minority of juries
(37%) “were more than half-White”).
191 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
192 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
193 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
194 Grant Duncan, an African American, was charged with battery after allegedly slapping a white boy while attempting to break up a confrontation between two black and four
white boys arising from the court-ordered desegregation of Louisiana’s schools. Duncan,
391 U.S. at 147. As a federal district court observed in enjoining further prosecution following the Supreme Court’s decision:
De minimus “batteries” of this kind occur repeatedly in Plaquemines Parish and
elsewhere and do not become the subject of criminal proceedings. The factors
bearing on the questions of harassment, considered together with the nature of
the conduct on which the charge is based, convince the court that the charge
against Duncan would not have been prosecuted, and certainly not reprosecuted,
were it not for the civil rights context out of which the case arose, for Duncan’s
selection of civil rights attorneys to represent him, and for the vigor of his
defense.
Duncan v. Perez, 321 F. Supp. 181, 184 (E.D. La. 1970), aff’d, 445 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1971).
195 419 U.S. at 527, 530 (“‘[O]ur notions of what a proper jury is have developed in
harmony with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government’ . . . . The purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power—to
make available the commonsense judgment of the community as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the professional or perhaps overconditioned or biased response of a judge. . . . Community participation in the administration of the criminal law, moreover, is not only consistent with our democratic heritage but
is also critical to public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system.” (first
quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 85 (1942); and then citing Duncan, 391 U.S.
at 155–56)).
196 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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selected or summoned to determine’ . . . [thereby] safeguarding a person
accused of crime against the arbitrary exercise of power by prosecutor or
judge.”197
The diversification of jury venires (and, indirectly, of juries) was thus
part of a deliberate effort to regulate law enforcement and make it more
democratically accountable. This is not to say that this was diversification’s
sole aim, but rather that we should consider the jury diversification cases
within the framework of that larger doctrinal project. As with the intentioned aspects of the shift from jury law-finding to fact-finding,198 those of
jury diversification both reflected the need for enforcement-finding and
fueled its expansion.
III. ACCOMMODATING ENFORCEMENT-FINDING
As criminal law and its enforcement have evolved over the last three centuries, the criminal jury has evolved with it. The criminal jury’s role, in other
words, accounts for the enforcement environment in which it functions.
Enforcement-finding arose, and persists, as a natural response to an enforcement environment characterized by a broad and pervasive penal scheme,
enormous enforcement discretion, and minimal outside regulation of
enforcement methods. And enforcement-finding has been buoyed by adjudicative changes—in the allocation of authority between judge and jury, trial
process, and the diversification and localization of venires—that reflect, in
some respects, those same transformations in enforcement.
So contextualized, enforcement-finding is not a problem to be resisted.
It is, instead, a natural and inevitable feature of our system, to be accepted,
accommodated, and even embraced. This is not to eschew constraints. To
the contrary, accommodating enforcement-finding requires setting boundaries. But it changes how we map them. Rather than attempting to draw lines
between “fact” and “law,” we must instead seek to balance enforcement-finding’s benefits against its potential harms.
This Part begins that effort, sketching an agenda for doctrine and institutional design. Institutional design should seek to minimize enforcementfinding’s risks while leveraging its potential systemic benefits. Doctrine
should balance enforcement-finding’s value against other potentially competing adjudicative values, such as accuracy and fairness. Section A works
towards the first goal, and Section B the second.
A.

Institutional Design: Minimizing Risk, Leveraging Potential

Enforcement-finding raises four primary concerns. The first is competence. We might worry, particularly based on what we know from studies of
juror decisionmaking, that jurors may simply get it wrong—overlooking serious investigative deficiencies on the one hand and disapproving perfectly rea197 Id. at 86 (first quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880); and then
citing Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156).
198 See supra subsection II.B.1.
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sonable conduct on the other. The second is the effect on juror selection
and, more specifically, on the racial composition of juries. If prosecutors
seek to strike those admittedly more skeptical of law enforcement, the data
indicates that such a move would disproportionally exclude black jurors from
criminal juries.199 The third is utility. Criminal trials are rare, and verdicts—
to the extent they are communicated to law enforcement at all—are black
boxes. As regulatory mechanisms go, we might think criminal trials among
the least effective. Finally, there are the accountability and rule-of-law concerns that accompany any robust interpretation of jury authority.
These concerns are valid. But to some degree, they obscure both the
reality and the goal. The reality is that jurors already evaluate law enforcement, both explicitly and implicitly, in ways that consciously or unconsciously
influence perceptions of the evidence.200 Given this reality, the inability of
existing frameworks to balance it,201 and the criminal enforcement environment that created and maintains it,202 debating the desirability and efficacy
of enforcement-finding is somewhat beside the point. Even if one thinks jury
evaluation of law enforcement is a really bad idea, there is no realistic means
of extinguishing it. Indeed, and as I hope the following discussion will
demonstrate, it is in trying to extinguish it that we risk further undermining
jury competence, minority representation on juries, regulatory efficacy, and
democratic accountability. We should instead enlist institutional mechanisms that help minimize these risks while leveraging enforcement-finding’s
potential.
1.

Competence

Jury research over the last several decades has shed some light on juries’
analytical strengths and weaknesses. Among other things, we know jury decisionmaking may be compromised by intrinsic human biases and cognition
deficits.203 We know that demographic characteristics, particularly race, age,
and geographic region of residence, play some role in juror decisionmaking—though the precise mechanisms of this role (including its potential as a
causal explanation) have yet to be worked out.204 And we know that the
adversarial trial process itself can sometimes exacerbate these biases and defi199 See supra notes 42–52 and accompanying text (discussing the interplay of race and
juror perceptions of law enforcement).
200 See supra Section I.A.
201 See supra Section I.B.
202 See supra Part II.
203 See generally DENNIS J. DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING: THE STATE OF THE SCIENCE
(2012) (collecting studies on the impact of human biases on jury decisionmaking).
204 See id.; see also Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really
Know About Race and Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 997 (2003) (collecting studies on how demographic characteristics impact jury
decisionmaking).
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cits, raising the risk that jurors will miscalculate the significance and reliability of particular pieces of the evidentiary puzzle.205
Yet if anything, this research illuminates enforcement-finding’s potential
to improve jury competence. Among other things, it shows us how the decisions and actions of law enforcement agents can shape, in ways both pervasive and invisible, the evidence the jury sees and how the jury perceives it.
Thus, providing greater leeway in probing investigatory competence will
enhance jurors’ capacity to evaluate and interpret the evidence.206 Nor
should we dismiss the jury’s ability to assess the appropriateness and legitimacy of law enforcement action. To the contrary, a body of citizens who
both depend on and are subject to law enforcement is perhaps the ideal
institution to make these evaluations, at least in the adjudicative context.207
Indeed, jurors already implicitly do this, and courts (sometimes) permit it,
albeit under the guise of presenting a “more thorough” or “complete” set of
facts.208 Such forays into law enforcement legitimacy would be far better
served if conducted openly, allowing the parties and court to explain to the
jury precisely why such evidence is being offered, and how it should be
considered.
In this way, jury instructions could enhance juror competence. When,
for instance, jurors hear the police stopped the defendant because they had
seen him selling drugs before, they should be instructed that the prior
uncharged drug-selling is being offered only so that they may assess the
appropriateness of the police officer’s lawful decision to stop the defendant.
When jurors hear that the police pulled over a car with four African-American occupants for driving five miles per hour over the posted speed limit,
they should be instructed both that the stop was lawful, and that they may
consider its circumstances in their overall assessment of the investigation.
Instructions dismissing juror competence to evaluate law enforcement—such
as the instruction that the prosecution is “not on trial,” or that particular
investigative techniques or the lawfulness of police or prosecutorial action,
are not the jury’s concern—diminish rather than enhance jury capacity.209
We could, instead, consider alternative instructions designed to help jurors
distinguish between appropriate evaluation of law enforcement—that is, eval205 See SIMON, supra 2; Christopher Slobogin, Lessons from Inquisitorialism, 87 S. CAL. L.
REV. 699, 705–08 (2014).
206 See Richman, supra note 13, at 698.
207 It is important to distinguish lawfulness from legitimacy: I do not propose that we
substitute the jury’s for the court’s judgment in constitutional determinations. For such
proposals, see supra note 14; for my argument against them, see infra subsection III.A.4. I
merely suggest that, once the court has determined action to be constitutional, the jury
may assess whether that action was also appropriate and legitimate.
208 See supra subsection I.A.1.
209 It is certainly true, for instance, that the lawfulness of police conduct is not before
the jury. But the appropriateness and legitimacy (or “rightfulness,” to borrow Meares’s
term) of police conduct is, and such an instruction obscures the distinction. See generally
supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.
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uation that goes towards reasonable doubt—and impermissible
nullification.210
Of course, like all jury assessments, those of law enforcement will be
informed by jurors’ own experiences and biases, and will be subject to the
dynamics of group decisionmaking.211 But unless we are prepared to reject
the jury as a decisionmaking body in criminal cases, we should not categorically cordon off evaluations of law enforcement from the jury’s domain. To
be sure, there are times when the circumstances will counsel in favor of such
limits.212 But the decision should be case- and circumstance-specific, mindful always of the cost of separating evidence from the critical question of how
it came to be.
It is also worth considering the alternative. Limiting probes of investigatory adequacy has a flattening effect: to the uninformed, evidence resulting
from methodical and thorough investigation appears no more reliable than
evidence produced through carelessness and haste. Telling juries that they
may not consider the lawfulness of police action does not tell juries what they
can consider, or how they should consider it—leaving jurors to speculate
(perhaps incorrectly) on law enforcement’s motivation or strategy, or, if evidence pertinent to law enforcement’s motivation was offered, on why it was
put before them in the first place. Eschewing or ignoring enforcement-finding, in other words, entails greater risk to jury competence than embracing
it.
Nor should we think that the jury’s evaluative role, if limited, will be
performed by more able institutional actors. Trial judges operate in the universe of laws: they determine whether a set of facts meets the legal floor.
Evaluating law enforcement is a more normative task.213 To be fair and balanced, normative assessments are best undertaken by a body of persons comprising a range of normative beliefs.214 Law enforcement itself, moreover, is
poorly situated to evaluate its own actions and performance; indeed, research
has shown the variety of psychological mechanisms that handicap effective
210

Consider, for instance, the following jury instruction, proposed by George Fisher:
Members of the jury, your job in this case is to decide the defendant’s guilt or
innocence. The lawfulness of Officer Johnson’s stop of the defendant’s car is not
before you. Officer Johnson’s actions were the subject of a separate proceeding
at which I decided whether the government should be punished because of those
actions. You are not to second-guess my judgment. You may consider the propriety of Officer Johnson’s actions only if doing so helps you decide the defendant’s
guilt or innocence.
E-mail from George Fisher, Professor, Stanford Law Sch., to author (June 18, 2016) (on
file with author). For more on distinguishing enforcement-finding from nullification, see
infra subsection III.A.4.
211 See Garvey et al., supra note 42.
212 See generally infra Section III.B (arguing in favor of a more transparent balancing
approach on questions of admissibility).
213 See supra Section I.B; see also infra subsection III.A.4.
214 See supra Section I.B.
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self-assessment in the investigative context.215 While other potential auditors—citizen review panels, internal review boards, government commissions—offer expertise and systemic context, their mandate is to ferret out
wrongdoing. But the space between laudable and reprehensible police work
is vast, and much of it unbounded by law or rules.216 It is there the criminal
jury offers value: a body of citizens comprising varying experiences, beliefs,
and norms, bringing to the task a layman’s perspective and forging from it a
literal “common” sense.
2.

Jury Composition

Of course, this description of the jury could rightly be criticized as
aspirational: a variety of factors in venire and petit jury selection can leave
our petit juries less reflective—racially, ideologically, and experientially, to
name but a few categories—of the larger community from which they are
drawn.217 Enforcement-finding is both a casualty of and contributor to
under-representative juries. Because minorities, and African Americans in
particular, have lower trust and confidence in law enforcement,218 their
under-inclusion impedes community-reflective enforcement-finding. At the
same time, recognizing trials as evaluations of law enforcement exacerbates
minority under-inclusion, because potential jurors voicing distrust in police
will be excused either through for-cause or peremptory strikes.219
215 See generally SIMON, supra note 2.
216 See Debra Livingston, The Unfulfilled Promise of Citizen Review, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
653, 661–69 (2004) (discussing the importance of remedying minor police misconduct
and the challenges of doing so through standard rule enforcement methods).
217 These include reliance on underinclusive methods to compile venire lists (such as
voter or drivers’ registration lists), see King, supra note 188, at 712–14, peremptory strikes,
see id. at 718, and self-selection (or, more accurately, “deselection”) bias among potential
jurors who harbor negative feelings about police legitimacy, see Tom R. Tyler et al., Street
Stops and Police Legitimacy: Teachable Moments in Young Urban Men’s Legal Socialization, 11 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 751, 771–74 (2014).
218 See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 46, at 71 (“Large numbers of blacks are convinced
that, in general, law enforcement authorities value the safety and well-being of whites more
than that of blacks.”); Fagan & Davies, supra note 46, at 458–63, 482, 499; Jason Sunshine
& Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for
Policing, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513, 532–34 (2003); Weitzer, supra note 46, at 151–52.
219 One anecdote from a New York City trial judge, relayed to Professor Jeffrey Fagan,
crystallizes the problem. The judge noticed that in her experience, distrust of police
seemed to result in the disproportionate exclusion of minorities from criminal trials. The
judge relayed that each time she informed members of the venire that they would hear
testimony and evidence presented by members of the New York City Police Department
and asked the potential jurors whether, in light of the expected involvement by the NYPD,
they could be fair, she noticed that a majority of blacks and Latinos in the venire
responded in the negative—at which point she felt she had no choice but to excuse them
for cause. E-mail from Jeffrey Fagan, Professor, Columbia Law Sch., to author (June 16,
2015) (on file with author).
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The dynamic is troublesome—all the more so given enforcement-finding’s potential impact on case outcomes.220 But we would be wrong to conclude that the way out is through a wholesale rejection of the jury’s evaluative
role. Contemporary criminal trials are, at least to a degree, necessarily and
inevitably trials of law enforcement.221 Recognizing and accepting this natural jury role is unlikely to worsen the dynamic of under-representative juries.
To the contrary, it might refocus our attention on more fruitful fixes, such as
to the rules around jury selection. For instance, we might redouble efforts to
compile broader venire lists. We might consider placing limits on voir dire
into law enforcement biases, for example by permitting inquiries into jurors’
capacity to be fair but curtailing lengthy forays geared towards peremptory
strikes. Or we might, as some have advocated, prohibit peremptory strikes
altogether.222
None of these potential responses, or others, will eliminate intra-jury
and jurisdictional variation in perceptions of law enforcement, and resulting
disparities in jury evaluations. But uniformity ought not be a prerequisite (or
a goal) of enforcement-finding. Variation is endemic to our criminal justice
system; it exists across institutional decisionmakers (police, prosecutors,
juries, and judges) and has, at least thus far, eluded efforts to eradicate it.223
We might recoil at the notion of adjudicative disparities, but it is what these
disparities may reflect—about police-community relations, trust in law
enforcement, and trust in the system more generally—that make them worthy of our deepest and most sustained attention.224
At the same time, there is reason to be optimistic about enforcementfinding’s potential to mitigate latent biases. Drawing greater attention to the
evidentiary backstory—to how the evidence was gathered and how it is
presented—might begin to unravel jurors’ ingrained perceptions about law
enforcement. For those who enter the jury box somewhat distrustful of the
police, the details of a thorough and impartial investigation will be illuminating. For those who enter accepting evidence at face value, hearing about
mistakes, poor investigatory decisions, or questionable motives will give
pause. This sort of de-conditioning is, after all, what we hope a trial will do.
Jurors do not interpret evidence as “blank slates,” nor should they. But we
might suspect an inverse relationship between the amount of evidentiary
220 See generally supra Part I.
221 See generally supra Part II.
222 See KENNEDY, supra note 46 (arguing in favor of abolishing peremptory strikes
because of their disparate (even if unintentional) exclusion of blacks from juries).
223 See, e.g., Daniel Richman, Institutional Coordination and Sentencing Reform, 84 TEX. L.
REV. 2055 (2006) (discussing the challenges of reining in variation in prosecutorial decisionmaking); Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420 (2008) (explaining that the Sentencing Reform Act failed to
eradicate sentencing disparities because it merely transferred the disparities’ source—discretion—from judges to prosecutors).
224 On the need to attend to the legitimacy-based sources of federal-state outcome disparities, see Ouziel, supra note 13.
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backstory jurors receive and the influence of their pre-existing ideologies,
biases, and experiences. It is an inverse relationship worth nurturing.
3.

Utility

Embracing jury evaluations of law enforcement is all good and well, we
might say, but to what end? Trials are rare. So, too, in many jurisdictions,
are jurors inclined towards critically assessing the work of law enforcement.225 With few exceptions, jury verdicts are not systematically compiled
and reported. Moreover, individual verdicts don’t always (or perhaps even
often) get communicated to the law enforcement officers who built the
case.226 Even when they do, the opacity of verdicts leaves parties to interpret
them in line with their institutional interests. Thus, when a mostly AfricanAmerican jury acquits an African-American defendant in a case replete with
shoddy police work undertaken by detectives with questionable motives (à la
O.J. Simpson), police and prosecutors may rationalize the acquittal as a product of race—discounting the substantial shortcomings of their work, as well
as the effects of police legitimacy (and its absence) on racial influences.227
If we frame enforcement-finding as a regulatory project, we would be
right to reject it as ineffective. But regulatory efficacy has never been a prerequisite of jury authority. We should acknowledge, accept, and attend to
enforcement-finding not because it is an antidote for the system’s ills, but
simply because it is: as long as police and public prosecutors enforce our
criminal laws, juries naturally will (as they should) judge them. Acceptance
of enforcement-finding need not—and should not—displace or distract us
from improving existing regulatory mechanisms. Internal review boards
should be supported, citizen review panels strengthened, federal, state, and
local commissions appointed, more case data gathered and analyzed. And
we should continue to talk about both the potential and limits of constitutional doctrine to shape police and prosecutors’ behavior.
At the same time, we can recognize, and seek to leverage, enforcementfinding’s regulatory potential. One benefit flows almost automatically from
accepting the jury’s evaluative role: fairer discovery practices. Embracing
enforcement-finding admits—indeed, proclaims—the materiality of law
enforcement action. In so doing, it reduces the all-too-frequent temptation
of prosecutors to convince themselves otherwise.228 This does not, of course,
solve deliberate discovery violations; prosecutors bent on violating the rules
will do so regardless of how those rules are framed. Far more common,
though, are the reckless violations that result when “materiality” is too nar225 See supra Section I.A.
226 See infra note 229.
227 See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text; see also ARMANDA COOLEY ET AL.,
MADAM FOREMAN: A RUSH TO JUDGMENT? 181–92 (1995) (recounting the discussion by
jurors in the O.J. Simpson trial denying that race played a part in verdict, and indicating
throughout that investigative errors played the largest role in deliberations and the
verdict).
228 See generally supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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rowly conceived. If acceptance of enforcement-finding does nothing more
than curtail these errors, it will have served a pressing regulatory need.
We can also imagine what enforcement-finding might accomplish with a
little institutional tweaking. Criminal trials today are missed opportunities to
facilitate communication and feedback between citizens and law enforcement. Institutionalizing data collection on jury verdicts, disseminating that
data to prosecutors and law enforcement agents, encouraging more direct
feedback between jurors and law enforcement (or communication through
impartial third parties, such as researchers or designated court officials)—
these and other mechanisms are well worth deeper consideration. None are
particularly radical. Judges often talk to jurors post-verdict, and sometimes
relay their conversations to prosecutors; and prosecutors sometimes speak
directly to jurors.229 Some courts and prosecutors’ offices already keep and
disseminate verdict data.230 And at least in the capital context, both the utility and feasibility of third-party juror interviews has been proven.231 We
could draw on these already-employed devices, enlarging and institutionalizing them far more broadly than we do.
Institutionalizing post-trial juror-litigant communication also helps
jurors. Because it is not just litigants and the public that wants (and needs)
juror feedback; jurors themselves so often want to give it, as has been illustrated in the countless books written and interviews given by former jurors,
and even by juror attempts to communicate more than a verdict form
allows.232 In this way, juror feedback reduces enforcement-finding’s poten229 That prosecutors don’t speak to jurors more often is at least partly a function of a
protective instinct around convictions and even mixed verdicts. Speaking to jurors risks
opening a Pandora’s box of information a defense attorney might use in an attempt to
impeach the verdict (and which prosecutors will accordingly be required to disclose). Yet
this fear is misplaced. First, the law creates an enormously high barrier to defendants
seeking to reverse convictions on account of jury improprieties; the risk that reversal-warranting improprieties actually occurred in a given case is miniscule. See, e.g., Tanner v.
United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987); see also FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (prohibiting juror testimony to impeach verdict except insofar as it relates to extraneous improper influences).
Second, if a conviction was obtained as a result of such impropriety, the interests of justice
demand it be outed in any event.
230 See, e.g., Data Dissemination Policy, WASH. CTS., (Sept. 6, 2013) https://www.courts.wa
.gov/datadis/?fa=datadis.policyDiss.
231 The Capital Jury Project, a decades-long study funded by the National Science Foundation, has administered and analyzed post-trial interviews with over 1100 jurors in more
than 350 capital trials across 14 states, generating over 78 articles and books on jury decisionmaking in capital cases. See What Is the Capital Jury Project?, U. AT ALBANY SCH. OF CRIM.
JUST. (last visited Nov. 10, 2016), http://www.albany.edu/scj/13189.php; see also Valerie P.
Hans, How Juries Decide Death: The Contributions of the Capital Jury Project, 70 IND. L.J. 1233,
1233–36 (1995) (discussing benefits of study and of post-trial juror interviews more
generally).
232 A recent example occurred during the verdict in S.E.C. v. Stoker, 865 F. Supp. 2d 457
(2012), a civil enforcement action arising out of the 2008 financial crisis. Along with its
verdict exonerating the defendant, the jury issued a formal statement to the prosecutors
advising that the verdict should not impede the government’s efforts to investigate and
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tial risk to accurate adjudication (and to the rule-of-law concerns discussed
below). If a jury thinks the evidence insufficient for conviction but fears
acquitting would penalize a good-faith and valiant law enforcement effort,
formal post-verdict communication would assuage that fear.233 Conversely, if
a jury believed the defendant’s guilt had been proven but by way of undesirable tactics, it would not be faced with a stark choice of implicitly approving
the prosecution’s case by convicting, or implicitly disapproving it by acquitting; instead, it could convict while formally voicing its disapproval.
4.

Democratic Accountability

Some may criticize this project (or, depending on one’s bent, praise it)
as engendering “nullification.” Others may think it does not go far enough:
Why not have the jury find the “law” of policing? Isn’t Fourth Amendment
reasonableness, after all, what enforcement-finding is about?
Answering the latter critique helps explain why the former is misplaced.
Jury evaluations of law enforcement will, as discussed, inevitably vary across
juries and jurisdictions.234 Variation impoverishes law’s power and utility.
This is particularly so when it comes to the laws governing police conduct. It
is in part for this reason that the Court has developed a strong preference for
bright-line rules in constitutional criminal procedure.235 Where the Court
has chosen to draw the lines may be criticized,236 but as aspirational goals,
clarity and uniformity are hard to quibble with.
At the same time, these goals have costs. In the policing context, clarity
and uniformity are best achieved by, for instance, assessing probable cause
from an ex ante perspective (that is, without regard to the challenged search
charge wrongdoers in the financial industry. See Peter Lattman, S.E.C. Gets Encouragement
From Jury That Ruled Against It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2012/08/03/s-e-c-gets-encouragement-from-jury-that-ruled-against-it/?_r=0. The foreman
later explained that the jury issued the statement because it feared the verdict, standing
alone, would be misinterpreted by the government. See id. (describing how the jury “was
left with an uneasy feeling that the verdict inadequately described its feelings about
Citigroup’s conduct,” and feared it would inadvertently discourage prosecutors from investigating and prosecuting financial crimes).
233 This is precisely what happened in Stoker. See supra note 232.
234 See supra notes 223–24 and accompanying text.
235 See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 577 (1991) (discussing the need for
constitutional criminal procedure to provide “clear and unequivocal guidelines to the law
enforcement profession” (internal quotations marks omitted) (quoting Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 151 (1990))); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979) (discussing
how Miranda’s bright-line rule enables police and prosecutors to know in advance and with
specificity what they may do in custodial interrogations).
236 See, e.g., Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 598 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court has certainly
erred if it believes that, by erasing one line and drawing another, it has drawn a clearer
boundary.”).
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or seizure’s fruits), and analyzing reasonableness objectively rather than subjectively.237 Yet these analyses necessarily shortchange policing realities.
This is why we need judges to set clear and uniform limits on police and
prosecutor authority, and we need juries to evaluate whether legally-exercised authority was put to good use. While the judge’s function must sometimes ignore the realities of a given situation, the jury’s function necessarily
embraces them. Because jurors are tasked with determining guilt, they evaluate law enforcement’s conduct within that context; in so doing, they balance
that conduct against the alleged harms it either sought to, or did, prevent.
To put the point more concretely: imagine three police stops of AfricanAmerican motorists driving five miles per hour over the speed limit. The first
is carried out in an effort to identify the target of a homicide investigation,
and it results (in addition to the identification) in the recovery of a bag of
marijuana. The other two are carried out because, according to police testimony, the drivers looked vaguely “suspicious.” The second stop also yields a
bag of marijuana; the third, a dead body in the trunk. Because the drivers
were speeding, all three stops are lawful. Yet from a normative perspective,
they are qualitatively different. The first is good policing. The second two
raise significant concerns, but each involves a different calculus. We are
probably willing to overlook our concerns when it comes to a dead body; less
so for a bag of marijuana. Also, our concerns about the officers’ motives
might lead us to question the reliability of the evidence itself. Depending on
the officers’ testimonies and demeanors, and the extent of corroboration, we
might reasonably doubt the prosecution’s narrative of the marijuana’s discovery and seizure. Yet it would be unreasonable doubt—indeed, it would be
absurd—to imagine officers, however questionable their motives, stopping a
car and planting a dead body in the trunk.
This is the sort of evidence-specific, normative calculus that juries are
best suited to perform. And it is precisely evidence’s place in the calculus—
balanced against, and interwoven with, law enforcement conduct and alleged
crime—that separates enforcement-finding from nullification. Nullification
presumes an irreconcilable divide between the evidence and the jury’s verdict.238 Enforcement-finding admits of a far messier reality.239
237 See Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory,
41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 266 (1993) (discussing the objective approach to reasonableness
across Fourth Amendment doctrine).
238 Those who define as “nullification” acquittals based (in part) on the undesirable
exercise of law enforcement discretion frame the scenario as one of undisputed factual
and legal guilt. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 7, at 1172–78; Butler, supra note 7; HannafordAgor & Hans, supra note 7, at 1254 (“Common to most definitions of jury nullification is
that juries . . . acquit the defendant although the jurors believe that the defendant is guilty
under the law.”). Yet in practice, undesirable or even questionable law enforcement conduct inevitably complicates the evidentiary picture.
239 See generally supra Section I.B; see also Hannaford-Agor & Hans, supra note 7, at
1274–76 (discussing a study seeking to isolate nullification as a potential ground for acquittal, which found jurors equivocal about evidential strength, and police credibility in particular, in cases they rated low on the scale of “legal fairness” or “outcome fairness”).
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Even if enforcement-finding does not raise rule-of-law concerns to the
same extent as nullification, it does raise concerns about accountability.
Returning to the scenario of the three motorists, we might suppose that once
a prosecutor has elected to pursue the second motorist, the jury should not
question that exercise of discretion. The prosecutor (or more accurately, her
boss), is, after all, democratically-elected—or, as in the federal system, at least
appointed by a democratically-elected official. The jury is not.
In an ideal world, democratically-accountable prosecutors’ normative
judgments may be preferable to undemocratically-accountable juries. But we
don’t live in an ideal world. In the world in which we do live, prosecutorial
accountability is severely limited,240 and prosecutorial decisions are the product of multiple and sometimes conflicting (and undesirable) influences.241
Criminal juries, meanwhile, are increasingly representative of the voting public—and in some jurisdictions, can sometimes be over-representative of the
demographic groups most affected by crime and policing.242 Sometimes,
democratic accountability can be bolstered by undemocratic institutions.243
When that’s the case, it makes little sense to handicap that process in the
name of democratic principle.
B.

Doctrine: Towards Transparency and Balance

Earlier I claimed that concerns about enforcement finding’s implications for juror competence, minority representation, utility, and accountability obscured both the reality and the goal. The reality, as I have argued, is
that juries already evaluate law enforcement.244 Futile efforts at limiting this
natural jury function will, if anything, only exacerbate these concerns. The
goal, then, should be apparent. Rather than trying to limit enforcementfinding, we should assimilate it within criminal adjudication’s larger aims—
such as fairness, accuracy, and above all, transparency. Thus, for each
enforcement-finding issue that arises, courts should balance the need for jury
evaluation of law enforcement against other potentially competing adjudicative values.
240 See Wright, supra note 189.
241 See, e.g., Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial
Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939, 966–67 (1997) (“Much work remains to be done in
exploring the personal ideologies of prosecutors, the influence of long-term economic selfinterest, and the psychological aspects of prosecutors’ self-selection.” (footnotes omitted));
William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1884–85 (2000) (exploring manifestations of the gap between the public’s interest in going after the most culpable
criminals and prosecutors’ interest in securing trial experience).
242 See supra notes 189–90 and accompanying text.
243 Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 30–33
(2010) (advancing a theory of non-sovereign institutions as an aid to democratic processes,
using the jury as an example); see also Corinna Barrett Lain, Upside-Down Judicial Review,
101 GEO. L.J. 113 (2012) (arguing that functional, structural, and political breakdowns can
sometimes render unelected institutions, such as the Supreme Court, more politically
responsive than elected ones).
244 See supra Section I.A.
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It is an immense order, not because it requires large wholesale change,
but, to the contrary, because it demands such nuanced and case-specific care.
The potential issues are endless. How, for instance, should we handle law
enforcement policies that, while lawful, may rankle? Jurors should know an
officer has dutifully followed his directives, and should assess the desirability
of those directives—yet we do not want to turn trials into policy referenda.
How should we handle the matter of extra-adjudicative events that may bleed
into jurors’ evaluations of law enforcement in a particular case? In the immediate aftermath of a controversial police shooting, for instance, should jurors
be instructed to put that event out of their minds, focusing only on the
actions of the individual officers in the case before them? Or should we let
the chips fall as they may, so to speak?
Or consider the earlier-mentioned car-stop scenario: Should the prosecution be permitted to elicit the officers’ intent to identify the defendant as a
target in a homicide investigation, even if the homicide is not among the
charges, and even if the defense has not opened the door to the officers’
motivations by questioning the circumstances of the stop? “No” might seem
the obvious answer. But what if the trial is in a jurisdiction known for high
levels of distrust in police—a place where the proverbial door has opened
without defense counsel so much as laying a finger on the knob? Should the
court forge a middle ground, allowing some explication of the officers’
action while concealing the precise conduct that led to it? Or should the
prosecution, and the police officers, be left to contend with the skepticism
they (at least in an institutional sense) helped create?
These are intensely normative questions. They have no easy answers,
nor do the countless other questions that will—and more to the point,
already do—arise in criminal courtrooms every day. The key is to acknowledge we are asking them. When courts differentiate between “fact” and “law”
in the enforcement-finding context, when they admit one piece of evidence
as going to “credibility” while excluding another as inviting “nullification,”
they are really making normative judgments about the extent and scope of
enforcement-finding that should occur. Better, then, to admit that—to
engage the normative inquiry openly and forthrightly. Admitting of enforcement-finding’s normative commitments will allow courts to confront those
commitments, grapple with them, and temper them with commitments to
other adjudicative values, such as accuracy, fairness, and efficiency. And over
time, these efforts will yield an enforcement-finding doctrine: a collective
judicial assessment of the circumstances in which enforcement-finding’s probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
undue delay, or other competing concerns.245 Given Rule 403’s preference
for inclusion, such circumstances should be rare.
For an illustration of what such a transparent balancing approach would
mean, consider one of the cases discussed earlier in this Article. In a series of
245 See FED. R. EVID. 403 (requiring that relevant evidence be admitted unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by, among other things, the risk of unfair prejudice or
undue delay).
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trials in the Eastern District of New York arising from a “war” between Brooklyn’s two reigning organized crime families, an FBI agent provided confidential FBI intelligence to an informant from of one of the families—an
egregious flouting of FBI protocol.246 In the absence of an evidentiary
framework that admits the value of such evidence to the jury’s evaluative task,
the defense was left to construct a convoluted, factually unsupported, and
disingenuous theory of admissibility: the improper leaks were part of a
“coup” orchestrated by the FBI agent and his informant, and thus the
defendants’ responsive acts of violence were a means of self-protection rather
than racketeering.247 In seeking to preclude this evidence, the government
was slightly more forthcoming: the defendants’ true purpose in offering the
evidence was to impugn the conduct of the FBI and U.S. Attorney’s Office,
the government argued, thereby discrediting the prosecution and obtaining
“an acquittal based upon jury nullification.”248
The government, of course, could afford to be more forthcoming: the
law/fact dichotomy frames this defense strategy as unpermitted “nullification.” Both the district court and court of appeals subscribed to that view,
precluding the evidence given the specious theory of relevance and the risk
that admitting it would “needlessly delay[ ] the trial” and lead the jury to
“improperly discredit the government’s case.”249
The courts had engaged in the same doctrinal subterfuge as the litigants. A strategy of discrediting the law enforcement agents who built the
case and the prosecutors who charged it can hardly be described as an
entreaty to jury lawlessness. The risk of the jury discrediting the government’s case, while prejudicial, is not necessarily unfairly so. And the additional time spent hearing this evidence (and the prosecution’s response to it)
is not so obviously “needless.”250
Indeed, whether prejudice was unfair and delay undue were genuine
questions, at the heart of which lay an inquiry left unaddressed: To what
extent did the actions of one agent taint the work of the entire law enforcement team? This was the evidence’s true probative potential. It would
enable the jury to assess whether the investigation, or at the least the investigators, had been compromised. To balance this value against competing
dangers, the courts needed to probe more deeply. Which members of the
team knew of the leaks? How long did they know? How did the leaks (and
the informant’s use of them) affect the investigation’s trajectory? A more
developed record on these issues could have better enabled the courts to
weigh probative value against potential harm. More importantly, such an
246 United States v. Malpeso, 115 F.3d 155, 162 (2d Cir. 1997); see also supra notes 25,
27.
247 Malpeso, 115 F.3d at 162.
248 Id.
249 Id. at 163.
250 See FED. R. EVID. 403 (requiring that relevant evidence be admitted unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by, among other things, the risk of unfair prejudice or
undue delay).
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analysis would have been more transparent and faithful to the real matters at
stake.
In this example, as in all enforcement-finding questions, what matters is
less the outcome than the process. Rather than disguising a given piece of
evidence’s true purpose, either as an improper attempt at “nullification” or a
means of presenting factual “background,” litigants and courts should
acknowledge and embrace enforcement-finding’s proper place within the
adjudicative scheme. If courts were to acknowledge openly, and to weigh
publicly, the benefits of jury assessment of law enforcement against the
harms in any given instance, they would enhance their own legitimacy, and
that of the jury’s verdict.
CONCLUSION
Criminal juries today necessarily find facts, occasionally define or refine
law, and invariably evaluate law enforcement. This latter role—what I have
called “enforcement-finding”—has attributes of fact-finding and law-finding,
but doesn’t fit comfortably within either model. Courts, litigants, and scholars too often mistake enforcement-finding for something else, or, recognizing it, apply a framework that doesn’t quite fit. We lack a theory to properly
frame enforcement-finding, institutional mechanisms to handle it, and a doctrine to appropriately set its parameters.
History provides the theoretical frame. The criminal jury is an evolving
institution; enforcement-finding, a natural adaptation. Over time, as criminal law and enforcement changed—from common law to statutory law; from
a vehicle for censure to also a tool of regulation; and from private to public
enforcement—the criminal jury evolved accordingly. And as public police
and prosecutors exercised greater power and discretion with fewer outside
constraints, the criminal jury’s role naturally accounted for that shift. In
short, juries judge law enforcement because law enforcement needs judging.
This insight should inform both doctrine and institutional design. Institutional design should mitigate enforcement-finding’s risks while leveraging
its regulatory and communicative potential. And doctrine should allow
courts to admit and engage the hard normative questions openly and forthrightly, tempering those normative commitments against enduring adjudicative values.
As regulatory interventions go, acknowledging and enhancing the jury’s
evaluative role is admittedly slight. This is a limitation, but also a virtue.
Criminal juries already evaluate law enforcement. Acknowledging,
accepting, and embracing this reality thus requires no herculean reworking
of our justice system, no drastic reimagining of our procedures. What is
needed instead is a clear-eyed look at what the criminal jury does and naturally must do, and how we can enable and ultimately leverage its task.

